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Some Important Causes for Settlement in American Civil Litigation
Felipe Forte Cobo a1

I – Introduction.
All rational man-made systems are concerned with efficiency. That is an
undeniable truth. The question, thus, is when a system can be deemed efficient. In order to
measure the efficiency of a civil justice system an accepted framework is cost-minimization. 1
Through this perspective, as synthetized by Kevin Clermont, civil procedure should maximize
society’s wealth minimizing social costs. 2 In other words, “you cannot reasonably overlook the
price of pursuing justice, no matter how you wish to define justice.” 3
This analysis of efficiency through decreasing economic costs and increasing
social gains is reflected in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which provides that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) “should be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” 4 By affirming justice as
a goal as important as speed and cost, the drafters made it clear that these three aims are equally
important for the FRCP.
The acceptance of an economic efficiency model is easier in civil litigation than
criminal prosecution because of the nature of the interests at stake, usually economic and private
a1

State Judge since March 2008, Judiciary Branch of the State of Parana – Brazil; J.D., Universidade de Sao Paulo;
LL.M. Candidate 2013, University of Georgia.
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KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 408 (Thomson West, 2d ed. 2009); SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 180-82 (Foundation Press, 2005)
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3
KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 412 (Thomson West, 2d ed. 2009)
4
FED. R. CIV. P. 1

2

ones, as opposed to concerns about life, liberty and punishment. As a consequence, civil justice
is seen by many less as a search for truth, than a manner to resolve conflicts between two private
parties, 5 contrasting with the criminal justice system where the nature of the interests at stake,
liberty and even life, requires more than a private peace to satisfy the public perception of
justice. 6 However, it is true that not all civil litigation presents purely economic and private
matters. In fact, family and civil rights cases are just two examples of civil litigation that
involves more than economics. For these civil disputes, as with criminal cases, justice is
something more than pure economic efficiency. 7
This paper is focused in pure economic disputes such as contract, real property
and tort conflicts, in which the economic efficiency model is very accepted. In this limited

5

Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1196 (2009)
(“In suits primarily or exclusively about damages, when a defendant agrees to a large payout but professes
innocence on the charges alleged, most people assume--correctly--that the defendant would not have settled had it
not believed there was at least some evidentiary basis for the claim. More fundamentally, in most damages actions,
the claimants are concerned less about a court finding of wrongdoing than they are about recovering compensation
for their injuries. Moreover, there is a strong societal interest in obtaining the deterrent effects that come from
compensation in ex post facto settlements. The notion that claimants in suits seeking exclusively or primarily
damages are disserved by not obtaining a formal court finding of wrongdoing does not comport with reality in many
circumstances.”) (footnotes omitted); See generally Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury
Verdicts in A System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) (“[T]he major structural reasons for the
special importance of settlement in American litigation--scarcity of judges and abundance of lawyers, adversarial
fact-finding, trial by jury--are all manifestations of a single cultural value: the preference for private ordering over
public control.”)
6
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
411, 413 (2009) (“Most observers reasonably view criminal prosecution as a function to be performed exclusively
by the state. Making charging decisions, plea bargaining, and litigating cases at trial or on appeal would all seem to
be functions solely within the exclusive province of full-time government lawyers to whom we commonly refer as
“prosecutors.””); See also Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1125, 1141 (2011) (“Agreeing not
to report a crime to the police in exchange for consideration is illegal under blackmail statutes in every jurisdiction
in the United States, generally with potential penalties of a year or more of imprisonment.”) (footnote omitted)
7
Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273 (2009) (explaining why the author is skeptical
with settlements as a mean for reaching justice, but always focusing in civil rights or mass litigation cases); See also
Jack B. Weinstein, Comments on Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement (1984), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2009)
(“There are cases in which settlement is not desirable. This was apparent from my work with the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund on the briefs and related negotiations among those diverse groups dedicated to eliminating racial
discrimination. The two most important cases on which I worked were Brown v. Board of Education and the One
Person-One Vote dispute. They required showdown litigation rather than settlement.”) (footnotes omitted)

3

scenario, the consensual resolution of disputes is always more efficient than decisions made by a
third-party decision-maker, whether from a post-trial or pre-trial perspective.
From a post-trial standpoint, whenever a third-person other than the parties
themselves decides the dispute, her decision may please at best only one of them. 8 In fact, if the
judgment is a full recognition of the plaintiff’s or defendant’s allegations, only one party will be
satisfied. However, as the parties’ allegations may be only partially recognized, a ruling can
actually displease both parties. Because of the dissatisfaction of at least one of the parties, the
legal system faces two consequences, no matter if the decision is a result of a bench or jury trial.
First, the losing party will be tempted to appeal (no party will appeal if she wins or, at least,
agrees with the resolution reached by a settlement). 9 According to Kevin Clermont, although
80% of the federal civil appeals are affirmed, still “[n]early one-fifth of losing parties decide that
they might as well stagger to the finish line, pretty much regardless of the chances on appeal.” 10
On a state level, the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 15% of the civil trials concluded in
2005 were appealed despite of a reversal rate of approximately 20%. 11 In cases where punitive
damages were awarded by state courts, the percentage of cases appealed was higher,
approximately 30%. 12 Second, the losing party will be less inclined to voluntarily comply with
the final resolution (after all, she probably disagrees with the result).

8

Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in A System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (“When a civil dispute ends in trial there is almost always a clear loser, and usually a clear
winner as well.”)
9
Donald J. Farole & Thomas H. Cohen, Appeals of Civil Trials Concluded in 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
2 (Oct. 3, 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/actc05.pdf (“In comparison to cases disposed by trial, settlements are
unlikely to be appealed because they tend to involve the resolution of disputes that could lead litigants to seek
further legal remedies.”)
10
Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1972 (2009)
11
Donald J. Farole & Thomas H. Cohen, Appeals of Civil Trials Concluded in 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 1 (Oct. 3, 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/actc05.pdf (showing that from 3,970 civil trials that
were appealed only 840 trial court outcomes were reversed or modified)
12
Thomas H. Cohen & Kyle Harbacek, Punitive Damages Awards in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 7 (Mar., 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdasc05.pdf

4

Both consequences directly impact the economic efficiency of the legal system.
By appealing, the losing party is contributing to overload a court of appeal’s docket, increasing
the consumption of time, not just for that specific case, but to all other cases on that docket.
Since lengthy disputes are related to higher litigation costs, 13 appeals also increase the costs of
the legal disputes, whether public (understood as the costs for the maintenance of the court
itself) 14 or private (attorney’s fees), 15 especially in a system like the United States which restricts
litigation cost-shifting. In the federal judicial system for the one year period ending September
30, 2012 the median time interval from filling a civil appeal in a lower court to final disposition
on the merits in the appellate court was 30.3 months. 16 Regarding state judicial systems, the
median time interval from filling a civil appeal in a lower court to final disposition on the merits
in the appellate court was 14 months. 17 By not complying with the final resolution, the losing
party makes a judicial enforcement necessary, adding to a judge’s docket (and this slows down

13

Corina Gerety, Excess and Access: Consensus on the American Civil Justice Landscape, INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 9 (2011),
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Excess_Access2011-2.pdf (pointing out the results of
national attorney surveys with Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers, Members of the American Bar
Association, Section of Litigation, and Members of the National Employment Lawyers Association, which showed
that 92%, 82% and 73% of each group respectively agreed with the statement “[t]he longer a case goes on, the more
it costs.” )
14
Judicial Branch Expenditures, VIRGINIA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM,
http://datapoint.apa.virginia.gov/exp/exp_checkbook_agency.cfm?AGYCODE=125 (last visited Apr. 18, 2013)
(showing that during the year of 2012 the Court of Appeals of Virginia spent $8,729,107.)
15
Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, Caseload Highlights, COURT
STATISTICS PROJECT, 6 (Jan., 2013) http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx (pointing out that postdisposition activity, including any appeal activity, accounted for 8% of total median hours spent by attorneys during
automobile tort litigation. )
16
Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2012 – Table B4A, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/B04ASep12.pdf (last visited Mar. 16,
2013)
17
Donald J. Farole & Thomas H. Cohen, Appeals of Civil Trials Concluded in 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 4 (Oct. 03, 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/actc05.pdf
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the trial of all other cases) and to the overall costs of the litigation (again public expenditures,
and private spent with attorney’s fees, as mentioned above). 18
From a pre-trial perspective, settlement is the most efficient form of case
disposition. For the parties, settlement always means saving litigation costs. In fact, due to the
absence of a cost-shifting rule in the American civil litigation, no matter who wins, there are still
unreimbursed litigation costs. 19 In this context, from the time the lawsuit is filed, both parties are
already losers. In other words, the longer it takes a dispute to end, the more both parties are
losing since their expenses will not be reimbursed by the so-called loser. 20 For the state, the
greatest advantage of settlements under an economic efficiency model is the saving of public
expenditures with courts, judges and jurors. The sooner legal disputes end, the greater the public
savings. 21 According to Nora Engstrom, adjusting for inflation cost figures provided by Chief
Justice Burger in 1985, the average public expenditure per trial in 2011 would roughly cost
$16,300. 22

18

JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 745 (Thomson West, 4th ed.
2005) (“For those litigants who seek damages from their opponents, a favorable judgment on the merits may prove
to be only the first skirmish in what turns out to be a very long, hard-fought battle to collect the award.”); See also
Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, Caseload Highlights, COURT
STATISTICS PROJECT, 6 (Jan., 2013) http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx (pointing out how much
post-disposition activity accounted for the median hours spent by attorneys during litigation: 8% for automobile tort
cases; 8% for premises liability disputes; 9% for real property litigation, 8% for breach of contract cases; 7% for
employment litigation; and 7% for professional malpractice cases. )
19
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 292 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“This feature of
remedial law means than an award of compensatory damages, no matter how precisely calculated, will always fall
short of full compensation if plaintiff has to pay her lawyer.”)
20
Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in Litigation, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 75, 79 (1993) (“Most civil litigation is a negative-sum game. The outcome is a transfer, perhaps equal
to zero, from the defendant to the plaintiff. This outcome appears to be zero-sum, but since litigation involves
significant costs in legal fees, expert fees, and time, it becomes more efficient to settle than to litigate.”)
21
Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource
Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 149 (2010) (finding that the average public
expenditure per case in the U.S. is $1,049)
22
Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 886 n.99 (2011) (“Chief Justice
Burger stated that the average jury trial costs taxpayers $8300. Warren E. Burger, Opening Remarks, 62 A.L.I. Proc.

6

Thus the advantage of a consensual resolution of litigation resides not only in the
effectiveness of the resolution, understood as the voluntary compliance with what has been
determined by the parties themselves, but also in the efficiency of the legal system, expressed in
a faster and less costly way to end the controversy to both the judiciary and the parties. In fact, as
pointed out by Professor Kevin Clermont, “[f]rom the viewpoint of the civil justice system,
settlement is a critical need. Ours is a slow and expensive procedure. The system simply would
not be able to adjudicate all cases filed. We depend on the parties finding alternatives to using
the system.” 23 Sharing the same view, District Judge Jack Weinstein states that
Settlements may be even more desirable in the mass
commercial age in which we now live. Unsettled disputes about
harms to large numbers of people across geographic and
demographic lines, caused by large entities, present risks of social
breakdowns without fair, timely, and efficient resolution. Timeconsuming adjudication results in excessive transaction costs and
unnecessary stress on individuals, families, local and national
economies, and government service networks. If we persist in
trying each dispute as if it were a unique horse-and-buggy collision
at a muddy intersection in nineteenth-century Cairo, Illinois,
businesses may be unfairly saddled with continuing litigations
while individuals claiming harm may be left almost indefinitely
adrift.

32, 36 (1985). Adjusted to today's dollars, this equals roughly $16,300. Inflation was calculated pursuant to CPI
Inflation Calculator, supra note 90.”)
23
KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 87 (Thomson West, 2d ed. 2009)
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Most mass tort cases must be disposed of by
settlement. Trying each of them would completely overwhelm the
nation's courts. 24
Settlements are more than an important tool for the economic efficiency model of
the civil justice system, they are a necessity for how the American civil procedure is currently
conceived. 25 There is a public interest in settling as many cases as possible. 26 That perception is
supported by the actual number of cases that go to trial in the federal civil justice system, making
the American civil procedure one of settlements. 27 During a 12-month period ending September
30, 2012, from the total amount of 271,385 cases terminated within the U.S. District Courts, only
3,212 (approximately 1%) reached the trial stage. 28 This low trial percentage pattern is also seen
in the state judicial system. According to Michael Heise, in a study using one year of civil jury
trial outcomes from 45 of the nation’s 75 most populous counties, only 3.5% of civil actions

24

Jack B. Weinstein, Comments on Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement (1984), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1266
(2009)
25
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Reexamining the Arguments in Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
1171, 1172 (2009) (“The first challenge is the inefficiency of the civil justice system. If you are against settlement in
any realistic way, however you define it, what is the alternative? Few can agree with Owen in terms of the practical,
day-to-day running of the civil justice system. The articles you read today are about the vanishing trial, not against
settlement. No one wants to go to trial. The consumers of the civil justice system do not like the costs, the
inefficiencies, the uncertainties, the frustrations, or the delays. That's one practical problem that undercuts the
aspirational objective.”)
26
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1996) (“We prefer settlements and have designed a system of civil justice that embodies and express
that preferences in everything from the rules of procedure and evidence, to appellate opinions, to legal scholarship,
to the daily work of our trial judges. Our culture portrays trial-especially trial by jury- as the quintessential dramatic
instrument of justice. Our judicial system operates on a different premise: Trial is a disease, not generally fatal, but
serious enough to be avoided at any reasonable cost.”) (footnotes omitted)
27
Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 449-50
(1994) (“Empirical evidence indicates that over 90 percent of cases filed are settled out of court…”) (footnote
omitted)
28
Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2012 – Table C04, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C04Sep12.pdf (last visited Mar.16,
2013)
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proceeded to a trial disposition. 29 More recently, a civil justice survey of state courts nationwide
found that during the year 2005 trials accounted for approximately 3% of all tort, contract and
real property dispositions in general jurisdiction courts. 30 In this scenario, it is crucial for lawyers
and judges to identify the important causes for settlement. From a lawyer’s perspective, the
importance of understanding this phenomenon lies in the fact that most of her work will be
performed as a settlement advisor, instead of as a litigator. 31 For judges, it is vital for the
management of their dockets to foster the consensual resolution of disputes in order to keep the
judicial dockets clear and ready for those cases that really need to be tried. 32 Even with
approximately 1% of all civil cases filed within the Federal District Courts reaching the trial

29

Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 813, 823 (2000) (“Only a small fraction (3.5 percent) of civil actions proceeded to a trial disposition. Because
so few cases filed wind up reaching trial, it is possible that the relatively small number of civil jury cases--the focus
of this study--differs systematically from the larger pool of civil disputes from which they emerge. Indeed, there are
strong theoretical reasons to expect certain differences generated by a selection effect. Expectations theory predicts
that objectively strong and weak civil cases will settle or conclude prior to reaching a jury trial.”) (footnotes omitted)
30
Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 1 (Oct., 2008), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf
31
Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1952-53 (2009) (“Shifting from
the viewpoint of the system to that of the disputants, settlement is also of critical importance. For them, in the usual
course, settlement is our system of justice (and for their “trial” lawyers, negotiation of settlements--and pursuit of
other alternatives to litigation--is what their profession primarily entails).”)
32
Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1210-12
(2009) (“To illustrate this point, I highlight below two of the things settlement offers to litigation: docket clearance
and selective case filtering…. The most conspicuous of settlement's contributions to modern litigation is its capacity
to reduce the number of cases demanding judicial resources and attention. Fiss appears to imagine that docket
lightening is, in fact, settlement's only contribution to our judicial system. Likening settlement to plea bargaining, he
declares both of them to be undeserving of praise. At best, he says, they are realities that must be suffered under the
constraints of current conditions. It is not my intention to weigh into the conversation about the morality of plea
bargaining, although I may be more sympathetic to its functioning than Fiss. Instead, I acknowledge at least part of
Fiss's point: settlement permits courts to function properly because of settlement's docket-management function….
Settlement offers at least the prospect of filtering out the “right” cases. Of course, one might argue that settlements
are, by the virtue of party autonomy, the “right” cases, by some simplistic definition. By this logic, unless some
form of coercion or other improper influence operates on disputants, causing them to settle, a private settlement is
evidence that the parties judged their consensual option superior to the prospects of litigation. In this mercenarily
individual-rationality sense, at least, settled cases were the “right” ones to settle, and those that do not settle were the
“right” ones to litigate…. But my point here is not about satisfying parties' interests. Instead my point is that
litigation fulfills its public function best if it is not called upon as the method of resolving every kind of dispute.”)
(footnotes omitted)

9

stage, this small percentage of cases still wait for approximately twenty-four months to be
tried. 33 Imagine what would happen if that percentage rate was higher.
Therefore, settlements in pure economic disputes are more efficient than trials
whether from a private or public perspective. From a private standpoint, settlements make the
dispute resolution much less expensive and faster for the parties since settlements prevent trial,
appeals, and judicial enforcement. From a public standpoint, settlements save public resources
such as courts, judges and jurors. Since the civil justice system must be concerned with
efficiency, this paper intends to uncover some significant causes for settlement in American civil
litigation in order to keep fostering consensual resolution of disputes. Considering that lower
transaction costs drive parties towards settlement, 34 part II of this essay provides an overview of
the American costs of legal disputes, framing several issues that might be determinative to
settlements. Part III explores how two specific American procedural institutes – discovery and
civil jury trial – contribute to settlements in the U.S. modern civil litigation. At the end, this
paper shows that the high settlement rate observed in the American civil litigation is not an
accident but a consequence of procedural tools and public policies that externalize an American
predilection for settlements instead of trials.
II – Transaction Cost of American Legal Disputes

33

Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2012 – Table C04, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C04Sep12.pdf (showing that during
a 12-month period only 1.2% of the total civil cases terminated within the Federal District Courts reached trial.) (last
visited Mar.16, 2013)
34
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 554 (Little, Brown and Company, 4th ed.1992) (“That cases
are ever litigated rather than settled might appear to violate the principle that when transaction costs are low, parties
will voluntarily transact if a mutually beneficial transaction is possible. In fact the vast majority of legal disputes are
settled without going to trial; one study found that only 2 percent of automobile accident claims are actually tried.
This is as economic theory would predict, but we have still to explain the small fraction that got to trial.”) (footnote
omitted)

10

Cost-minimization is the core of what can be called an economic model for civil
litigation which provides a coherent and objective guideline in the attempt of determining the
parties’ behavior in pure economic disputes. 35 Accordingly, a party’s goal is the best cost/benefit
relationship which is expressed by a balance between low costs and high benefits. For this
model, efficiency is achieved when a party pays the cheapest price for getting the closest she can
to her optimal dispute outcome. Since settlements occur when they express a party’s best
cost/benefit relationship, it is important to understand the costs of legal disputes in the United
States and in which ways they might be determinative of dispute outcomes.
Transaction costs of legal disputes are basically spread through bargaining costs,
discovery costs 36 and litigation costs. 37 Each of these three costs will be mostly defined by court
costs, attorney’s fees and expert witness fees. 38 Court costs usually are filling fees, copying fees
and cost for witnesses. 39 Attorney’s fees are billed whether hourly, flatly or on contingency. 40
Hourly and flat billings are the most usual way for charging for legal services except for
plaintiffs in personal injury cases that ordinarily use contingency fees. 41

35

SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 108 (Foundation Press, 2005)
Corina Gerety, Excess and Access: Consensus on the American Civil Justice Landscape, INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 11 (2011),
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Excess_Access2011-2.pdf (showing that half of the
lawyers answering to a national attorney survey pointed out that discovery consumes at least 70% of expenditures in
cases that are not tried.)
37
Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 449
(1994)
38
See generally Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, Caseload
Highlights, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, 1-2 (Jan., 2013) http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx (acknowledging the
preponderance of the attorney’s and expert witness’ fees to the total cost of the legal disputes.)
39
Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of
Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 9495 (2005)
40
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.5 (2012)
41
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 131 (Wolters Kluwer Law &
Business, 9th ed. 2012) (“If we omit personal injury cases, where contingent fees predominate, flat rates and hourly
billing are the most common ways lawyers charge for their services.”)
36
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Nora Engstrom provides some dollar figures for the cost of litigation in the U.S.
According to her, a defendant would pay approximately $9,900 to defend each lawsuit in
automobile tort litigation. 42 Providing some more figures, the Preliminary Report to the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, based on a survey of attorneys from May to
June, 2009, stated that
For the closed cases included in the sample, the
median cost, including attorney fees, was $15,000 for plaintiffs and
$20,000 for defendants. For plaintiffs, reported costs ranged from
$1,600 at the 10th percentile to $280,000 at the 95th percentile; for
defendants, the range was from $5,000 at the 10th percentile to
$300,000 at the 95th percentile. 43
More recently, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) released a study with several
median costs of litigation depending on case type. Accordingly, the median cost of litigation for
cases that progressed all way through trial and post-disposition proceedings was: for automobile
tort cases – $43,000; for premises liability cases – $54,000; for real property – $66,000; for
employment – $88,000; for contract – $91,000; and for professional malpractice – $122,000. 44

42

Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 825 (2011)
Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Preliminary Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 2 (Oct., 2009),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf
44
Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, Caseload Highlights, COURT
STATISTICS PROJECT, 7 (Jan., 2013), http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx
43
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Attorney’s fees often account for the major expense in the costs of legal
dispute. 45 Regarding the total value charged by a lawyer at the end of a legal dispute, attorney’s
fees billed by hour should not vary that much from flat or contingency fees, since they all take in
account the expected amount of time required to perform a specific legal task. 46 Still, one could
think that lawyers working on contingency basis would be prone to charge more because of the
inherent risk of recovering nothing. 47 Surprisingly, according to a 2009 Federal Judicial Center
study, “[h]ourly billing was associated with higher reported costs for plaintiff attorneys. Plaintiff
attorneys charging by the hour reported costs almost 25% higher than those using other billing
methods (primarily contingency fee), all else equal.” 48
Since legal fees are proportionally charged to the dispute’s complexity and
length, 49 time plays an important role in defining the costs of the legal dispute. 50 The math is

45

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 521 (Little, Brown and Company, 4th ed.1992) (“The
government subsidy of litigation is modest. The main expenses – attorneys’ fees – are borne entirely by the
litigants.”); See also Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation,
12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 357, 374 (2011) (discussing the different impacts of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
68 depending on whether it includes or not attorney’s fees, “which account for the majority of litigation expenses.”);
See generally Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, Caseload
Highlights, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, 1-2 (Jan., 2013) http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx (acknowledging the
attorney’s preponderance to the total cost of the legal disputes, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) has
developed a method for cost estimation: the Civil Litigation Cost Model (CLCM), relying on the amount of time
expended by attorneys in various litigation tasks.)
46
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 131 (Wolters Kluwer Law &
Business, 9th ed. 2012) (“[F]lat fees are often hourly rates in disguise. A lawyer predicts how much time the work
will require (probably estimating high) and multiplies by an hourly rate.”); See generally STEPHEN GILLERS,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 144 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 9th ed. 2012)
(explaining that the amount of work required is one of the factors a lawyer will take in consideration when deciding
the contingency fee arrangement.)
47
Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation, 12 FLA. COASTAL
L. REV. 357, 367 (2011) (“A successful plaintiff's attorney will generally be entitled to a larger compensation under
a contingency fee system than under an hourly rate, due to the attorney assuming the risk of receiving no payment at
all.”) (footnote omitted)
48
Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Litigation Costs in Civil Cases: Multivariate Analysis, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, 6 (Mar., 2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf
49
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(1) (2012) (providing for the need of reasonable fees, proportional to
the time spent by the lawyer)
50
Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Litigation Costs in Civil Cases: Multivariate Analysis, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, 5-7 (Mar., 2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf
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intuitively simple, the sooner the dispute ends, the less the party spends on attorney’s fees. The
Judicial Business of the United States Courts Report 2012 points out that the median time
interval from filing to disposition of civil cases may vary from 7.6 months to 23.5 months,
depending on whether the dispute ended before pretrial stage or at trial stage. 51 That range might
provide some idea about how much the cost of legal dispute may vary, especially when the
lawyer is hired on an hourly fee basis, if a case faces a full trial scenario instead of an early
settlement one. Analyzing the results of a 2009 Federal Judicial Center study, Danya Shocair
Reda highlights that “[u]nsurprisingly, when a case was terminated through trial, it also tended to
have higher costs, around twenty-four percent higher than cases not ending in trial, all other
factors being equal.” 52 However, that twenty-four percent cost increasing was observed from a
defendant’s perspective. From a plaintiff’s perspective, cases terminated by trial had even higher
costs than cases that did not, approximately 53%, all else equal. 53
Because attorney’s services present a cost to the parties involved in a legal dispute
and because this cost is usually proportional to the length of that dispute, the mere presence of
lawyers should push the parties towards settlement, as quickly as possible, so they could save
attorney’s costs. On the other hand, since in practice attorneys might have a private economic
interesting on longer or shorter litigation (usually depending on the fee arrangement) one might
argue that they will frame the dispute to their clients in such a way so that it reflects their

(finding that cases with longer processing times were associated with higher reported costs for plaintiffs and
defendants, all else equal)
51
Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2012 – Table C05, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C05Sep12.pdf (last visited Mar. 16,
2013)
52
Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR.
L. REV. 1085, 1110 (2012)
53
Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging , Litigation Costs in Civil Cases: Multivariate Analysis, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, 5 (Mar., 2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf
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preference towards settlement or trial. 54 In this scenario, hourly practitioners would be prone to
risk their client’s chances on trials, 55 while lawyers working on flat or contingency fee
agreements would face a huge incentive to settle a dispute even when, according to their client’s
best interest, it would be better to try the case. 56 Expressing this dual role that an attorney might
have towards or not a settlement, Jeffrey Rachlinski points out:
[T]he framing model of litigation poses a powerful role for the
attorney. The attorney can control the client's frame, thereby
influencing settlement decisions in either direction. The attorney
may or may not use this ability to serve his clients' best interests.
54

Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation, 12 FLA. COASTAL
L. REV. 357, 368 (2011) (“The attorney's personal stake in the case may also encourage unethical behavior, conflicts
of interest between the attorney and client, and the pursuit of unconscionably large settlements. Mistrust may corrupt
the attorney-client relationship if the client receives less net compensation than anticipated, or the attorney collects a
large fee relative to the work performed. If a defendant offers to settle immediately, an attorney may be tempted to
accept the offer and receive a large payday for merely filing a complaint, even though the attorney knows the client
is likely to receive a larger payment at the end of a lengthy and work-intensive trial.”) (footnotes omitted)
55
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 170 (1996)
(“Initially, attorneys seem to face an incentive structure that promotes wasteful litigation. To the extent that the
litigation lasts longer and the parties decline to settle, attorneys make more money in fees.”);
56
Angela Wennihan, Let's Put the Contingency Back in the Contingency Fee, 49 SMU L. REV. 1639, 1654-55
(1996) (“At first glance, the contingency fee seems to align the attorney's interests with that of the client. And to
some extent, that is clearly true. Obviously, both the client and the contingent fee attorney have the same general
interest in the outcome in the case. However, the contingent fee does not necessarily lead an attorney to devote the
amount of time and effort to a case that would maximize the client's net return.
If a particular number of hours of work would result in the largest net recovery for the client, the client desires the
attorney to work that amount of hours. However, the lawyer has no direct economic incentive to work that particular
number of hours because her goal is to get the largest amount of recovery in the shortest amount of time. ‘Lawyers
on contingent fee are said to have an incentive to make a ‘quick kill’ before too many additional hours are spent at
possibly only a marginal increase in the lawyer's fee.’ Thus, the contingent fee system can create an incentive for an
attorney to deprive the client of the right to make her own decisions in litigation, such as when to settle a claim. The
lawyer and the client have the same interests only when the case goes to the jury; before that time the attorney
actually has a strong incentive to settle the case, which could be in conflict with the plaintiff's best interests.”)
(footnotes omitted), See also Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1224-25 (2009) (“Agents sometimes negotiate settlements with which their clients are
disappointed. In an ideal world, agents would understand and represent fully their principals' views of the relevant
interests, parameters, tradeoffs, and opportunities. In practice, agents do not always understand their clients'
priorities and underlying interests. In practice, agents sometimes have incentives at least partially at odds with some
of their clients' interests. And, as a practical matter, agents cannot always bring every decision back to their clients
for a new round of consultation. People do not merely hire agents for the agents' skill sets. Sometimes, a client hires
an agent because the client does not have the bandwidth to do everything himself or herself. With the delegation of a
task to an agent comes the risk that the agent will behave differently than the client would prefer.”) (footnote
omitted)
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An avaricious defense attorney who works on an hourly rate may
portray all settlements as losses so as to encourage the risk-seeking
proclivities of the client. After all, the defense attorney is the
principle beneficiary of risk-seeking decisions in litigation.
Likewise, a plaintiff's attorney, operating on a contingency fee and
interested in a quick settlement, may encourage the client's
inherent risk-aversion. 57
Coincidence or not, a study conducted by Thomas Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard and
Dean Miletich found that “[d]isposition times were also related to the attorney’s billing method.
Cases in which the attorney reported billing on an hourly basis took longer than other cases.” 58
Still, Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud remember that trying a case against the
client’s interest violates rules of professional conduct and, as far as a survey with lawyers that
have tried cases in California Superior Courts shows, conflicts of interests between attorney’s
and clients were not a significant cause for trials. 59 With many variables, differing from case to

57

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 172 (1996)
Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery and
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 533 (1998)
59
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in A System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 54 (1996) (“We do not doubt that plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants' insurers sometimes act in conflict
with the best interests of the parties. But we do not believe that such conflicts (strategic or otherwise) are a common
cause of trials. Taking a case to trial against the interests of the client violates professional norms, and may subject
the attorney or the insurance company to formal or informal sanctions. Norms and sanctions do not eliminate abuses,
but they do suggest that the disfavored behavior is the exception rather than the rule. In this context, our survey data
are consistent with that expectation. The attorneys we interviewed frequently said that the trial was caused by the
opposition's stupidity or stubbornness, but no defense attorney said that there was no settlement because the
plaintiff's attorney wanted a shot at a major verdict, and no plaintiff's lawyer said that it happened because the
defendant's insurance company had little to risk at trial and was unconcerned about its insured.”) (footnotes omitted)
58
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case and perhaps from lawyer to lawyer, it is unclear whether attorneys foster settlements or
not. 60
Another specific feature of the U.S. legal system is that it provides that the parties
should bear most of the costs of litigation since the expenses with evidence production and legal
representation are not borne by the government. 61 Each party must pay for the expenses of its
own investigation of facts. The system usually does not provide for public attorneys advocating
purely private matters, not even for the needy. 62 Although pro bono legal services are
encouraged by professional rules, 63 American lawyers on average provide only thirty-nine hours

60

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 170-71 (1996)
(“Furthermore, even attorneys paid on an hourly rate may be more interested in maintaining a continuing
relationship with their clients than extracting extra fees in any single case. Gilson and Mnookin also have proposed
that attorneys have the ability to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma that litigation creates. Thus, it is unclear whether
attorneys are a positive or a negative influence on the social costs of litigation.”) (footnotes omitted)
61
Edward H. Cooper, Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment on Cooter and Rubinfeld, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465, 47475 (1994) (“We have a system that requires the parties to bear many of the costs of litigation....Why should lawyers
not be provided as a public service to any litigant who would rather trust a public lawyer than pay a private lawyer?
Why should other costs of investigation and preparation not be paid according to the budget judgments of a public
official? And so of discovery: Why should any part of the cost be carried by the parties, much less nonparties? There
is something crude and almost offensive about rationing access to public dispute resolution by ability and
willingness to pay, but we do it.”)
62
Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1228
(2009) (“In practice, modern disputants encounter a number of different barriers to court access. The most
conspicuous reason disputants might not perceive themselves to have access to the courthouse stems from financial
concerns. In short, litigation is expensive, and many--accurately-- perceive litigation's justice as beyond their price
range.”); See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the
Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 134-35 (2010) (pointing out
surveys showing that only 37% of poor households facing legal needs actually sought third party assistance in U.S.
versus 65% in Scotland)
63
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2012) (“Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide
legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal
services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: (a) provide a substantial majority of the (50)
hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to: (1) persons of limited means or (2) charitable, religious,
civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters that are designed primarily to address the
needs of persons of limited means; and (b) provide any additional services through: (1) delivery of legal services at
no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights,
civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational
organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees
would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate; (2) delivery
of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or (3) participation in activities for
improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession. In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute
financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means.”)
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a year of it, approximately 2% of all legal effort. 64 On the top of that, the American rule prevents
the winner from recovering the whole transaction cost of the legal dispute, since it restricts costshifting. 65 This system has been long criticized because of its apparent unfairness. Wealth
imbalance between plaintiff and defendant might be more determinative of the outcome than the
merits of the dispute. 66 The argument supports that plaintiffs and defendants could use their
wealth to force an unfair settlement on the weakest party, defined as the one who lacks enough
economic resources to equally pursuit its rights all the way through bargaining, discovery and
trial stages. That is the view of Owen Fiss, who argues that
The disparities in resources between the parties can
influence the settlement in three ways. First, the poorer party may
be less able to amass and analyze the information needed to predict
the outcome of the litigation, and thus be disadvantaged in the
bargaining process. Second, he may need the damages he seeks
immediately and thus be induced to settle as a way of accelerating
payment, even though he realizes he would get less now than he
might if he awaited judgment. All plaintiffs want their damages
immediately, but an indigent plaintiff may be exploited by a rich
defendant because his need is so great that the defendant can force
him to accept a sum that is less than the ordinary present value of
64

Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource
Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 130-31 (2010)
65
Edward H. Cooper, Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment on Cooter and Rubinfeld, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465, 47475 (1994) (“[T]he victor is awarded some part of the costs to an extent that depends on the nature of the litigation,
while victor and vanquished each bear substantial portions of their own costs.”)
66
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 287 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“[E]ither outcome
may represent surrender to financial exigency: A plaintiff gives up strong case because she cannot afford to litigate
any further; a defendant offers something to make a plaintiff with a trumped-up claim go away because winning on
the merits will cost more than the settlement offered.”)
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the judgment. Third, the poorer party might be forced to settle
because he does not have the resources to finance the litigation, to
cover either his own projected expenses, such as his lawyer's time,
or the expenses his opponent can impose through the manipulation
of procedural mechanisms such as discovery. It might seem that
settlement benefits the plaintiff by allowing him to avoid the costs
of litigation, but this is not so. The defendant can anticipate the
plaintiff's costs if the case were to be tried fully and decrease his
offer by that amount. The indigent plaintiff is a victim of the costs
of litigation even if he settles. 67
Supporting this assumption, an analysis based on national surveys of attorneys,
including members of the American College of Trial Lawyers (“ACTL”), the American Bar
Association (“ABA”) and the National Employment Lawyers Association (“NELA”), found that
“in the experience of all of the attorney groups, the cost of litigation does hinder access to
judicial case determination on the merits.” 68 In fact, the majorities of attorneys answered that
their firms would turn away cases when it is not cost-effective to handle them (accordingly,
ACTL: 81%; ABA: 82%; NELA: 88%). 69 More than that, the majority also agreed that the costs

67

Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984) (footnote omitted)
Corina Gerety, Excess and Access: Consensus on the American Civil Justice Landscape, INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 9 (2011),
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Excess_Access2011-2.pdf
69
Corina Gerety, Excess and Access: Consensus on the American Civil Justice Landscape, INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 9 (2011),
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Excess_Access2011-2.pdf
68
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of litigation force cases to settle that should not settle based on the merits (accordingly, ACTL:
83%; ABA: 83%; NELA: 59%). 70
However, some scholars have advocated that a powerful tool has been more used
recently to compensate that potential wealth imbalance – third-party funding of litigation. 71
Contingent-fee agreements have allowed plaintiffs who lack financial resources to hire very
sophisticated law firms with economic capacity to fund expensive litigation. 72 This third-party
funding has made possible huge settlements favoring those plaintiffs as it happened in the Vioxx
case, settled with $4.85 billion.73 For them, big law firms, working on contingency basis and
financing the transaction costs of the legal dispute, would be an effective remedy against a
wealthy defendant who would be prevented from forcing a settlement on an unfair basis just
because of a plaintiff’s lack of financial capacity for litigation. 74

70

Corina Gerety, Excess and Access: Consensus on the American Civil Justice Landscape, INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 9 (2011),
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Excess_Access2011-2.pdf
71
Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation, 12 FLA. COASTAL
L. REV. 357, 367 (2011) (“To nullify these concerns, perhaps the most beneficial, and arguably most detrimental,
feature of the American Rule has developed--contingent fees…. The contingency fee system ensures those with
valid claims will not be discouraged from pursuing their legal rights due to personal financial limitations. In
addition, contingency fees allow individual plaintiffs to challenge large institutional defendants and use litigation as
a means for initiating societal reform.”) (footnotes omitted)
72
Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1180-81
(2009) (“We are hardly the first commentators to note the rise in strong, financially successful plaintiff law firms
with the capacity to prosecute and fund expensive and protracted litigation. These firms are capable of litigating
against the largest, most powerful defense law firms in the country”) (footnotes omitted)
73
Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1183
(2009)
74
Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 813, 845-46 (2000) (“When a plaintiff secures the financial backing of a lawyer, or more likely a law firm, the
economic differences between the typical plaintiff (an individual) and defendant (a non-individual) erode. Put
differently, in such circumstances an “individual” plaintiff benefiting from contingency fee financing begins to
resemble a “non-individual” in terms of financial resources. And, as previously discussed, results in Table 6 reveal
that the presence of non-individuals in civil litigation correlates with longer case disposition time.”)
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Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud emphasize the importance of third-party funding
to legal disputes nowadays. 75 According to their empirical study with claims for monetary
damages that actually went to trial in California Superior Courts (thus, incurring in all
transaction costs), individual plaintiff attorneys were paid on a contingent-fee basis for 96% of
the times. 76 Besides, 88% of the individual plaintiffs have the out-of-pocket costs of litigation at
least partially advanced by their attorneys. 77 On the other hand, although defense attorneys were
almost invariably paid by the hour, 78 72% of all defendants had their legal fees and costs entirely
paid by their insurance company. 79 In light of these numbers, they conclude:
Thus, the typical civil jury trial is a personal injury claim by an
individual against a large company, in which neither party is
playing with its own money: The plaintiff is represented by an
attorney whose fee and expenses will be paid out of the recovery
(if any), and the defendant has an insurance policy that covers all
defense costs and any likely judgment.
However, if a third-party is funding the litigation, it means that a party other than
the plaintiff and the defendant possesses an economic interest at stake. Whether that situation
affects settlements or not should depend on two factors. First, the attorney’s compliance with the
professional rules which establish the ethical duties for lawyers and conflicts of interests. As set
75

Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 6 (1996)
76
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1996)
77
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 17 (1996)
78
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1996)
79
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1996)

21

forth above, a lawyer should not decide whether to settle or not based on her private interest on
the case. 80 Second, the liability insurance contract which defines who has the power to accept or
reject settlements, the insurer or the insured. Even from an economic standpoint, insurer and
insured may have different interests on settling ot a dispute. Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud
explain these different interests pointing out that:
If the plaintiff makes a demand at or near the policy limit, the
defendant will probably want to take the settlement, which is free
to him, rather than risk a trial after which he might be stuck with
personal liability for damages above that limit. Most liability
insurance contracts, however, give the insurance company the
power to accept or reject settlements, and the insurance company
may prefer a trial: It cannot lose more than the policy limit one
way or the other, and, for the price of trying the case, it might save
itself a settlement of about that amount. 81
Another unique feature of the American legal dispute costs is the so called
“American rule”. Accordingly, none of the dispute costs are subject to reimbursement by the
losing party. 82 In other words, for most cases, the loser is not required to pay for the winner’s
expenses regarding both attorney’s fees and court costs. As the American system restricts cost-
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Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 54 (1996) (“Taking a case to trial against the interests of the client violates professional norms, and may
subject the attorney or the insurance company to formal or informal sanctions. Norms and sanctions do not eliminate
abuses, but they do suggest that the disfavored behavior is the exception rather than the rule.”) (footnotes omitted)
81
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 53-54 (1996) (footnotes omitted)
82
Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation, 12 FLA. COASTAL
L. REV. 357, 365 (2011) (“Under the American Rule, a prevailing litigant may not recover their expenditures on fees
from the opposing party.”) (footnote omitted)

22

shifting, the plaintiff will always fall short of full compensation. 83 Because of that feature, from
the time the lawsuit is filed, both parties are already losers. Moreover, since time is money, 84 the
longer it takes for the dispute to come to an end, the more both parties are losing, since their
expenses will proportionally increase. 85 The high costs of litigation in U.S. together with the lack
of a cost-shifting rule might be the reason why it is estimated that only 46% of the total tort
litigation cost goes to victims, whether as economic or non-economic damages. 86
In this situation, the American legal restriction on cost-shifting should make
parties more willing to settle the dispute since they are not going to recover the money they are
investing on it. 87 However, this view is not shared by Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud to whom
the American rule actually creates incentive to trials since it reduces the monetary risks to the
losing party. 88 In fact, the adoption of a cost-shifting rule would make the loser pay not just for
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STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 292 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“This feature of
remedial law means than an award of compensatory damages, no matter how precisely calculated, will always fall
short of full compensation if plaintiff has to pay her lawyer.”)
84
Corina Gerety, Excess and Access: Consensus on the American Civil Justice Landscape, INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 9 (2011),
http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Excess_Access2011-2.pdf (pointing out the results of
national attorney surveys with Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers, members of the American Bar
Association, Section of Litigation, and members of the National Employment Lawyers Association, which showed
that 92%, 82% and 73% of each group respectively agreed with the statement “[t]he longer a case goes on the more,
the more it costs.” )
85
Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Litigation Costs in Civil Cases: Multivariate Analysis, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, 5-7 (Mar., 2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf
(finding that the longer a case takes to reach termination, the higher the costs will be, all else equal: for plaintiffs, a
1% increase in case duration is associated with 0.32% increase in costs; for defendants, a 1% increase in case
duration is associated with a 0.26% increase in costs.)
86
Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of
Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 90
(2005)
87
David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the "American Rule"
and "English Rule", 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 609 (2005) (“To pose the argument in a slightly different
manner, under the “American rule,” if both parties are certain of victory, they will still settle in cases where the cost
of victory at trial is more than the cost of settling; whereas, the “English rule” would encourage the litigants to
proceed to trial in order to have a full recovery in the case of the plaintiff, or no loss in the case of the defendant.
Thus, one may conclude that “‘the likelihood of trial under the British system will be greater than under the
American system.’”) (footnotes omitted)
88
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1996) (“The alternative to attempting to provide more information about the outcome of the case
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her own expenses but also for her adversary’s. Because parties are more willing to settle before
high risk scenarios, changing the American rule and increasing the amount that a party may have
to pay in case she loses the dispute would make both parties more willing to settle the dispute. 89
Hence, the American rule would discourage settlements.
The drafters of the Federal Rules seemed to have embraced this rationale in Rule
68, 90 which provides:
(a) MAKING

AN

OFFER; JUDGMENT

ON AN

ACCEPTED OFFER. At

least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending against
a claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment
on specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If, within 14 days
after being served, the opposing party serves written notice
accepting the offer, either party may then file the offer and notice
of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter
judgment.
(b) UNACCEPTED OFFER. An unaccepted offer is considered
withdrawn, but it does not preclude a later offer. Evidence of an
unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to
determine costs.
(c) OFFER AFTER LIABILITY

IS

DETERMINED. When one party's

liability to another has been determined but the extent of liability

is to alter the rules under which it is litigated. The common method is to increase the risk of trial by requiring the
losing party to pay some or all of the winners’ legal fees…. The result might be an overall change in the pattern of
civil litigation, including, perhaps, a reduction in the number of trials.”)
89
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1996)
90
FED. R. CIV. P. 68
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remains to be determined by further proceedings, the party held
liable may make an offer of judgment. It must be served within a
reasonable time—but at least 14 days—before the date set for a
hearing to determine the extent of liability.
(d) PAYING COSTS AFTER AN UNACCEPTED OFFER. If the judgment
that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the
unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the
offer was made. 91
In Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985), the Supreme Court explained that
The plain purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlement and avoid
litigation. Advisory Committee Note on Rules of Civil Procedure,
Report of Proposed Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 433, 483 n. 1 (1946),
28 U.S.C.App., p. 637; Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S.
346, 352, 101 S.Ct. 1146, 1150, 67 L.Ed.2d 287 (1981). The Rule
prompts both parties to a suit to evaluate the risks and costs of
litigation, and to balance them against the likelihood of success
upon trial on the merits. 92
Testing that assumption, a study performed by Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve
Rassenti, Daniel Simmons, and Erik Tallroth, evaluated the effects of increased litigation costs

91
92

FED. R. CIV. P. 68
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985)
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on settlements. 93 Their empirical experiment with undergraduate students at George Mason
University revealed that its subjects tended to behave as intended by the drafters of the FRCP.
The higher the amount at risk (as if a party may have to bear both parties’ expenses) the more
prone they were to settle the dispute. Accordingly, the overall settlement rate under low expected
cost was 58.7% against 77.7% in high cost cases. 94 This might suggest that Federal Rule 68 95
really promotes a higher compromise disposition by conditioning cost-shifting to the decline of
an offer that is better to the oferee than the final trial outcome. However, most courts have not
applied the cost-shifting provisions of Rule 68 96 to attorney’s fees, “by far the most significant
trial expenditure.” 97 Because settlement rates were higher before increased costs, Professor
Inglis et al. propose a broader definition of “costs” for purposes of Rule 68 98 so it also includes
attorney’s fees. 99 Therefore, the actual drawback of Rule 68 100 would be that the courts have
narrowly construed the term “costs incurred” so it usually does not include attorney’s fees. 101
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Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of
Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89
(2005)
94
Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of
Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 116
(2005)
95
FED. R. CIV. P. 68
96
FED. R. CIV. P. 68
97
Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of
Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 95
(2005) (“In most instances, attorneys' fees, by far the most significant trial expenditure, are not recoverable under
Rule 68”) (footnotes omitted);
98
FED. R. CIV. P. 68
99
Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti, Daniel Simmons & Erik Tallroth, Experiments on the Effects of
Cost-Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 116
(2005) (“This suggests that high court costs create strong incentives for settlement. One possible application of this
result is to increase court costs by including attorneys' fees as recoverable costs in cost-shifting rules, such as Rule
68 and section 998.”)
100
FED. R. CIV. P. 68
101
Christopher R. McLennan, The Price of Justice: Allocating Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation, 12 FLA. COASTAL
L. REV. 357, 374-76 (2011) (“However, critics argue Rule 68 fails to provide a powerful incentive for parties to
make and accept settlement offers because courts commonly interpret Rule 68's ambiguous language as not
including attorneys' fees, which account for the majority of litigation expenses…. Several courts have refused to
include attorney's fees in those costs subject to Rule 68's cost-shifting provision, even though the underlying
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Whether the American rule fosters settlements or trials seems to depend on the
parties’ expectations about the trial outcome. 102 If there is uncertainty for both parties about the
trial outcome, the American rule seems to promote more trials since the monetary risks to each
party are limited to her own expenses. On the other hand, if the trial outcome is very predictable,
the American rule should foster settlements because even the expected winner will prefer to
settle in order to save the trial expenses. 103
This seems to provide a good overview of the costs of American legal disputes
and their interaction with the parties’ behavior towards settlement. The specific costs of
discovery and civil jury trial, and their relationship with settlements will be analyzed in each
topic bellow, respectively.
III – Discovery and Civil Jury Trial Contributions to the High Percentage of Settlements in
American Modern Civil Litigation
A) Discovery.
A.1. Pleadings and Discovery

substantive statute expressly described attorneys' fees as costs. Circuit courts have split on whether attorneys' fees
are “subject to Rule 68's cost-shifting provisions.”) (footnotes omitted)
102
David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the "American Rule"
and "English Rule", 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 610 (2005) (“In the end, whether the ‘English rule’
decreases the frequency of settlements seems to turn on the parties' beliefs regarding the strength of their respective
case.”) (footnote omitted)
103
David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the "American Rule"
and "English Rule", 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 609 (2005) (“To pose the argument in a slightly different
manner, under the “American rule,” if both parties are certain of victory, they will still settle in cases where the cost
of victory at trial is more than the cost of settling; whereas, the “English rule” would encourage the litigants to
proceed to trial in order to have a full recovery in the case of the plaintiff, or no loss in the case of the defendant.
Thus, one may conclude that “‘the likelihood of trial under the British system will be greater than under the
American system.’”) (footnotes omitted)
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During the nineteenth century, beginning with New York, and then followed by
other states, the common law pleading system was changed in an effort to make it simpler for the
parties. 104 According to this new system, known as “code pleading,” because it was first drafted
as the “Field Code” (New York) and followed by other state codes, 105 the pleadings would
perform a guiding role, shaping the case and establishing the controversy. 106 In fact, the code
formulation required litigants to bring “a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting
each cause of action (defense or counterclaim) without unnecessary repetition.” 107 The statement
of the facts constituting each cause of action rather than the statement of the claim was essential.
This approach had its critics who argued that the rigidity of pleadings rules would
cause the parties to waste time and energy fighting on technical matters of procedure rather than
on the underlying facts or merits. 108 The critics were right as evidenced by the battle among
lawyers, judges and doctrine to determine what should be the meaning of “facts” according to the
Code. 109 Moreover, the courts could not draw a clear line between an “ultimate fact,” which was
deemed indispensable to the claim, and an “evidentiary fact,” that should not be part of it. 110
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SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 20 (Foundation Press, 2005)
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 20 (Foundation Press, 2005)
106
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 255 (Thomson West, 4th ed.
2005)(“They argue that without a set of rules, rigidly applied, courts will be clogged with unjustified cases, some
that never should have been brought, and some that cannot legitimately be defended. Trials that do take place will be
sloppy affairs, admitting as evidence testimony that bears remotely at best on the true issues at stake.”)
107
N.Y.LAWS 1851, c. 479, § 1.
108
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 255 (Thomson West, 4th ed.
2005)
109
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 263 (Thomson West, 4th ed.
2005) (“Nevertheless, goaded on by litigious attorneys, the courts turned the “fact” pleading requirement into a
nightmare that in some jurisdiction all but destroyed the effectiveness of the reform.”)
110
, MARY JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 263 (Thomson West, 4th ed.
2005); See also Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 57 (2010) (“One of the
primary shortcomings of Code pleading was the distinction between ‘ultimate’ facts, which were required to be
pleaded, and ‘evidentiary’ facts and ‘conclusions of law,’ which were not to be pleaded. Those distinctions proved
unworkable in practice and resulted in a level of technicality and factual detail in the pleadings that became
counterproductive.”) (footnotes omitted)
105
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In response to the chaos associated with “code pleading,” the U.S. Supreme Court
promulgated in 1938 a different pleading system which has become known as “notice
pleading.” 111 In fact, Federal Rule 8 112 requires the parties to state “a short and plain statement of
the claim” as opposed to the facts constituting each cause of action. 113 Now, the standard
required from the parties in federal court is no longer to state facts, but to state a claim, which
means that the pleadings must just be clear enough to reveal the basic nature of the dispute. 114
This lower standard is also seen in the forms in the Appendix to the Rules.
For many decades, the Supreme Court followed its precedent in Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41(1957), defining notice pleading as just a manner of giving fair notice of the
pleader’s contentions to the adversary. In Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court stated that
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to
set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the
contrary, all the Rules require is ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms
appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this. 115
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JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 267 (Thomson West, 4th ed.
2005)
112
FED. R. CIV. P. 8
113
FED. R. CIV. P. 8 – “(a) CLAIM FOR RELIEF. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and
plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim
needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of
relief.”
114
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002);
115
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)
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Recently, however, the Supreme Court has heightened the pleading
requirements. 116 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Court found that
the alleged parallel conduct of different companies (with the possibility of discovering more
relevant facts after discovery) was not enough to present a claim for conspiracy under antitrust
law. 117 The plaintiff should allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” 118 Twombly created a plausibility test and an inquiry into the pleading’s convincingness. 119
After some uncertainty of its applicability beyond antitrust disputes, the Supreme Court, in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), made it clear that “[t]hough Twombly determined the
sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and
application of Rule 8. That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States District Courts.’” 120 Despite these recent Supreme Court
decisions, heightening the pleading requirements, their effects are still not fully understood. 121
However, it may be the change is minimal. First, but for civil rights cases, it has been reported
that courts dismissal rates are practically the same as they were before Twombly and Iqbal. 122
Second, so far there has been no amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor to its
forms.
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Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1930-31 (2009)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (“An allegation of parallel conduct is thus much like a
naked assertion of conspiracy in a § 1 complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but without some
further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitle[ment] to
relief.’”)
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (emphasis added)
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Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1931-32 (2009)
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009)
121
Charles B. Campbell, Elementary Pleading, 73 LA. L. REV. 325, 351 (2013) (“Not surprisingly, Twombly and
Iqbal have triggered a wave of empirical studies attempting to quantify what, if any, impact the cases are having on
civil litigation. So far, the results are conflicting and inconclusive.”)
122
Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1934 (2009); See also Joe S.
Cecil, George W. Cort, Margaret S. Williams & Jared J. Bataillon, Motions to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim After Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, vii (Mar., 2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf (“There
was no increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at which a grant of a motion to dismiss terminated the case…)
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For this paper, it is important to highlight that notice pleading still requires a
lower standard of fact presentation than code pleading. Besides, even after Twombly the pleading
requirements still fall far from detailed factual allegation. 123 In this scenario, without a strict fact
pleading requirement and allowing the parties to plead according to the low standard of the
simple “notice of a claim”, it was (and it still is) necessary to create other tools that narrow the
controverted facts and issues subject to judgment. The broad rules of discovery in the FRCP fit
this role. 124 Because of the “notice pleading system,” discovery has as one of its main purposes
to “ascertain the issues that actually are in controversy between the parties.” 125 More than that,
discovery, as conceived by the Federal Rules, is fundamental to the parties to delimit which facts
are really in dispute. 126 This relationship between notice pleading and discovery makes the latter
essential to fostering settlement in American civil litigation. In fact, it is reasonable that
knowledge of which facts are really in controversy is a premise for any meaningful discussion
towards a consensual resolution of the dispute.
A.2. Information Gained Through Discovery
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (“Here, in contrast, we do not require heightened fact
pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the
plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be
dismissed.”)
124
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (“This simplified notice pleading standard relies on
liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of
unmeritorious claims.”); See also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 268 (Thomson West, 4th ed. 2005) (“The federal rules by formally including broad rules of discovery
and an elaborate provision for summary judgment adequately filled any gap left by less stringent pleading
requirements.”) (footnotes omitted).
125
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 398 (Thomson West, 4th ed.
2005); Also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (“The various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a
device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 16, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and
(2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those
issues. Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear,
consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before trial.”)
126
Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 58 (2010) (“In line with the ‘liberal ethos’
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pleadings were designed to ensure that case-screening mechanisms were
delayed until after some fact discovery.”) (footnotes omitted)
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As pointed by Stephen Yeazell,
Both state courts and the federal system have adopted broad civil
discovery rules that permit a lawyer to uncover, in advance of trial,
enormous amounts of information. The scope and depth of modern
U.S. discovery practice make it unique among today’s legal
systems. This scope permits the bringing and defense of claims
where all or much of the relevant information lies in the possession
of the other side. 127
According to the Federal Rules, parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense, even if the information
sought is not admissible at trial but is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. 128 In this context, the scope of discovery has been construed very broadly by the
courts, as one should expect in a notice pleading system. 129 In Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v.
Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978), the Supreme Court held that
Consistently with the notice-pleading system established by the
Rules, discovery is not limited to issues raised by the pleadings, for
discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues.
Nor is discovery limited to the merits of a case, for a variety of
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STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 458 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012)
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); See Horizons Titanium Corp. v. Norton Co., 290 F.2d 421, 425 (1st Cir. 1961) (“Rule
26(b) provides that the deponent may be examined ‘regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action….’ It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be
inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”)
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Horizons Titanium Corp. v. Norton Co., 290 F.2d 421, 425 (1st Cir. 1961) (“This rule apparently envisions
generally unrestrictive access to sources of information, and the courts have so interpreted it.”)
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fact-oriented issues may arise during litigation that are not related
to the merits.
On the other hand, a deeper reading of the Rules shows that there are some
restrictions in scope, including: privileged information, material obtained in preparation for trial,
and physical or mental examinations (except if there is a good cause and the physical or mental
conditions are in controversy). 130 Besides, the rules still demand some relevance regarding the
sought information. For instance, in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., the Supreme Court found that
would be proper to deny discovery of matters that were relevant only to claims or defenses that
have been stricken because discovery must be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. 131 These limitations, however, are not significant on the broad sweep of
discovery.
The discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is initiated with the
conference of the parties, which must be held as soon as practicable and at least 21 days before
the initial pretrial conference. 132 During this conference, the parties must consider the nature and
basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the
case. 133 If settlement is not reached and the case proceeds, then the parties must develop a
proposed discovery plan. 134 Therefore, the first step of the federal discovery is to bring the
parties together to make them better understand each pleading and to build a plan to discover the
130

8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
119-20 (West, 3d ed. 2010)
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Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351-52 (1978) (“Discovery of matter not ‘reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ is not within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1). Thus, it is proper
to deny discovery of matter that is relevant only to claims or defenses that have been stricken, or to events that
occurred before an applicable limitations period, unless the information sought is otherwise relevant to issues in the
case.”)
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FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1)
133
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2)
134
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2)
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facts and evidence that support their cases. As a matter of fact, the conference also gives the
parties a first impression of the strength and weakness of their pleadings and provides an
opportunity to at least initiate a settlement discussion. 135
Within 14 days after this first conference, 136 the FRCP state that a party must,
without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties:
(i) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of
each individual likely to have discoverable information—along
with the subjects of that information—that the disclosing party
may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be
solely for impeachment;
(ii) a copy—or a description by category and location—of all
documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things
that the disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or control
and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would
be solely for impeachment;

(iii) a computation of each category of damages claimed by the
disclosing party—who must also make available for inspection and
copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary
material, unless privileged or protected from disclosure, on which
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STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 474 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“The initial round
of disclosures asks each party to put its basic evidentiary cards on the table. In the process it helps each lawyer form
a general idea of the case he will be facing. That may produce settlement discussions, and it also gives a very
general sneak preview of the main evidentiary attractions at summary judgment and trial.”)
136
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C)
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each computation is based, including materials bearing on the
nature and extent of injuries suffered; and

(iv) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34, any insurance
agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to
satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the
judgment. 137

This mandatory initial disclosure was introduced as part of the discovery procedure by the
drafters in 1993 and its purpose was “to accelerate the exchange of basic information about the
case and to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such information….” 138 Initial
disclosure, thus, is another procedural discovery tool aimed to provide to the parties an early
understanding about the facts and evidence that are going to support their claims, promoting an
earlier disposition of civil cases, including through settlement. 139
Furthermore, according to the Federal Rules, the parties have six discovery
devices: oral depositions, written depositions, interrogatories, production of documents and such,
physical and mental examination, and requests for admission. 140 Through these tools the parties
may access practically all facts and evidence that are going to be used in an eventual trial. “Thus
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(Thomson West, 2d ed. 2009)
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civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear,
consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of
the issues and facts before trial.” 141 Moreover, according to the Federal Rules the “[p]laintiff is
as free to seek information relevant to a defense as he is to seek matter relevant to his or her own
case.” 142
In this context, the first stage of discovery, the conference, gives both parties, at
the beginning of the lawsuit, the opportunity to settle the case before further expenses are
incurred. Furthermore, as discovery requests are satisfied litigants have the same information
about each other, even unfavorable facts, giving them the same facts and evidence that are going
to support an eventual trial. In other words, discovery puts the parties in a position of
symmetrical information. Whether this equality in information fosters settlements is analyzed in
the next section.
A.3. Effects of Symmetrical Information on Settlements
Initially, it is known that other factors besides pure economic efficiency may play
a decisive role in a party’s choice to litigate a case instead of settling it. In fact, some parties may
prefer to litigate their cases as a matter of strategy, as it happens with insurance companies trying
to build a tough reputation, 143 or with medical malpractice cases, 144 where the doctors have a
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reputation to maintain, or when a new matter is posed to the court and there is a precedent to be
created. 145 In all these cases, even knowing that litigation is not economically viable, parties may
still want to try cases. Moreover, behavioral characteristics may play a decisive role on
settlement decision. Risk-averse parties are more willing to settle than risk-seeking ones.
Humans subjectively value losses more than gains, even if the monetary amount at stake is
exactly the same. 146 These features bring a sort of variables to the parties’ negotiations,
influencing their bargaining. However, this work focuses on an economic model for the civil
settlements and, thus, the parties are considered neutral to any bargain tactics as to any litigation
risks. It also assumes that the parties have symmetrical stakes.
In this scenario, intuitively, there should be no reason for the parties to go to trial,
increasing their costs even more, most with attorneys’ fees, if they are both aware of their real
chances to succeed and to fail. 147 In other words, if the parties decide to go on with the lawsuit
wanting a judicial decision and paying more for that, probably it is because they have different
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expectations about the outcome. 148 This conclusion becomes even stronger due to the absence of
a cost-shifting rule in the American civil litigation. In fact, no matter who wins, there would still
be the unreimbursed cost of the litigation. 149 In this context, from the time the lawsuit is filed,
both parties are already losers. As a result, the longer it takes the dispute to end, the more both
parties are losing since their expenses will not be reimbursed by the so-called loser.
Given all the assumptions above, it is believed that once parties have the same
expectations about the probable trial outcome they should prefer settlement rather than trial,
since the longer it takes to reach the final resolution the more the parties are losing in judicial
costs and attorney’s fees. 150 On the other hand, different hopes regarding the future trial outcome
would make them prefer to try cases. Hence, the important question is: what is it that makes the
parties have the same or different expectations? The logical answer is information. 151 One builds
expectations based on what he/she knows about the facts playing a causation role in this
cause/consequence model where the consequence is the outcome of the possible trial. In light of
this reasonable and quite simple logic, the more the parties have the same information, the more
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they are inclined to agree about the future outcome of the litigation. 152 Once their expectations
about the probable findings of the factfinder (no matter if a jury or a judge) are closely the same,
their desire of reducing their losses by a faster and cheaper agreement should be stronger.
Discovery allows the parties to learn about, prior to trial, all the information that
each one is seeking to use in order to convince the factfinder about its rights, correcting false
optimisms and approximating their expectations to the probable trial outcome. 153 Doing so,
discovery makes parties willing to settle for the economic reasons set forth above. Thus, it might
be said that “[t]he first purpose of discovery is to increase the probability of settlement. This
purpose is achieved by enabling the parties in a dispute to pool information so as to predict the
outcomes of a trial more accurately.” 154
In order to provide a framework that measures the effects of discovery over
settlements, Cooter and Rubinfeld work with the optimism/pessimism dichotomy about trial
outcomes. 155 They set the premise that
Optimism about trial will reduce the advantage that the parties
perceive in settling. Relative optimism about trial exists when the
judgment expected by the plaintiff exceeds the judgment expected
by the defendant…. In order for settlement to be possible, the
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savings in cost to the parties must exceed their relative optimism
about trial…. 156
Thus, the smaller the relative optimism the more likely the parties will settle. Since in an
adversarial context in order for one be right the other must be wrong, it is fair to assume that
“[w]hen the parties are both optimistic (relative to the expected outcome with complete
information), at least one of them is uninformed.” 157 Discovery fosters settlements by correcting
false optimism and by reducing the variance in the parties’ expectations as to make litigation
more expensive than settlement.
An empirical study performed by Laura Inglis, Kevin McCabe, Steve Rassenti,
Daniel Simmons, and Erik Tallroth about how discovery affects settlements proves the above
assumptions. 158 Their experiment
[M]odeled a lawsuit as a bargaining game between subjects
interacting anonymously in the roles of plaintiff and defendant.
The plaintiff initiated the suit by sending a compensation request to
the defendant. The parties were then given a fixed period of time in
which to negotiate a settlement. If they failed to reach an
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agreement within that time, the court imposed a decision and both
parties were required to pay court costs. 159
The subjects for the experiment were undergraduate students and received
earnings based on their performance. In light of the empirical results, the study concluded that
[S]ettlement rates declined as the difference between Min and Max
[which were the lower and upper boundary for a court decision,
respectively] increased. This may be due to the fact that when the
difference between Min and Max is small, both parties have a high
degree of certainty about the court outcome. Rational negotiators
will therefore settle to avoid the court costs. 160
On the other hand, Cooter and Rubinfeld call the attention for a negative effect of
discovery on settlements. Since pessimism about trial outcome would encourage the pessimist to
settle, discovery that corrects a party’s pessimism should make her more willing to try the case.
Therefore, discovery, by compelling the involuntary pooling of information, subtracts the
informed party advantage over the uninformed one that could prejudice settlements. 161 Although
Cooter and Rubinfeld’s conclusions seem reasonable, the economic advantages of settlement
under symmetry of information still remain. Moreover, discovery provides a safe harbor to
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parties averse to negotiate in the dark, protecting them from unfair agreements, without losing
the economic incentives for settlements.
In fact, the information symmetry granted by discovery fosters not only
settlements, but also provides the grounds for an agreement closer to what a judicial decision
would be. Since discovery allows the parties share all the evidence that would be presented at
trial, their negotiation occurs on the same basis in which the judicial decision should be
constructed. As a result, the settlement tends to reflect the outcome of a fully informed trial. 162
Furthermore, as pointed out by Bruce Hay, by admitting requests for even inadmissible materials
(since it could lead to admissible evidence), discovery may lead the parties to discover evidence
that otherwise would remain concealed at trial. 163 Assuming that trial accuracy depends on the
quantity of information available to the court, Hay concludes that discovery increases trial
accuracy. Since symmetric information makes settlements reflect likely trial outcomes, by
increasing trial accuracy discovery is also increasing settlement accuracy. 164
Therefore, settlements reached after full discovery should satisfy the efficiency
aimed by Federal Rule 1, 165 since they would secure a resolution that is, on the one hand, speedy
and less expensive than trial and, on the other hand, as just as the likely outcome after trial.
Supporting the discovery role in fair outcomes, whether by settlement or trial, Judith McKenna
and Elizabeth Wiggins highlight the findings of the Columbia Project for Effective Justice, a
project commissioned by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to conduct a field survey of

162

Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model Of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 445
(1994) (“Discovery affects the perceived merits of the case by helping to eliminate biased beliefs about trial.
Aligning the subjective expectations of the parties with the merits of the case makes the rational settlement
correspond to the complete information judgment.”)
163
Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481, 497 (1994)
164
Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481, 497 (1994)
165
F. R. CIV. P 1

42

pretrial discovery in federal courts. 166 The researches found that 78% of the lawyers said that
discovery helped a just disposition of the litigation, instead of only 21% (mostly losers at trial)
said it made no difference. 167 Thus, discovery increases the quantity and the quality of
settlements.
A.4. Effects of Discovery’s Costs on Settlements.
As already discussed, parties may have asymmetry of information. This is a
situation that can be fixed through discovery, encouraging the parties to settle for the economic
reasons set forth above. Because full information settlements reflect full information trial
outcomes, it is expected that settlements after discovery also should be as fair as a judicial
decision. However, correcting this imbalance has a price, the discovery price. As pointed by
Stephen Yeazell, “[g]ood data on the costs of discovery is hard to come by, but in some cases
discovery will be a major expense. Worse, for a defendant who ultimately prevails, the costs of
that discovery will sometimes represent the major cost of litigation.” 168
Judith McKenna and Elizabeth Wiggins did a detailed analysis for the Columbia
Project for Effective Justice, a project commissioned by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
to conduct a field survey of pretrial discovery in federal courts. 169 They pointed out the
difficulties in studying discovery costs; in particular because of different attorney-fee
arrangements, and variability on discovery costs depending on the type of case and party.
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According to the Columbia Project findings, in antitrust actions, discovery represented 65% of
plaintiffs’ costs and 63% of defendants’ costs, while in patent cases discovery represented 21%
of plaintiffs’ costs and 54% of defendants’ costs. 170 The authors also referred to some studies
showing a relationship between discovery incidence and the stake at the center of the case:
Glaser found that the incidence of discovery was related to
attorneys' predictions of the amount that would be recovered. Only
two-thirds of respondents who predicted recovery of $2500 or less
used discovery, whereas 75% of those predicting recovery between
$2500 and $40,000 used discovery, and 92% of respondents
predicting recovery of more than $40,000 did so. In Walker's Iowa
study, the volume of discovery was related to the amount in
controversy--cases with more than twenty requests were more
likely to be cases with higher amounts in controversy….
… Small-case attorneys used discovery less often and less
intensively, devoted a lower percentage of total billable time to
discovery than did large-case attorneys and committed higher
percentages of their time to investigations, negotiations and
trials. 171
A more recent study commissioned by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
and conducted by Thomas Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard and Dean Miletich
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(“Thomas Willging et al.”) found that 50% of the total cost of litigation reported by attorneys
was due to discovery and that “the proportion of litigation costs spent on discovery differed little
between plaintiffs and defendants.” 172 Their analysis also confirms that the amount of discovery
is proportional to the parties’ stake. 173 However, the latest study commissioned by the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules showed a reduction of discovery cost percentage in relation to the
total cost of litigation. Accordingly, “[t]he median estimate of the percentage of litigation costs
incurred in discovery was 20 percent for plaintiffs and 27 percent for defendants.” 174
Discovery is an American creation related to the notice pleadings of American
civil procedure. As set forth above, Federal Rule 8 175 requires the parties state “a short and plain
statement of the claim,” instead of “the facts that constitute each cause of action”, as “code
pleading” did. Even after the Supreme Court decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007), heightened pleading requirements by creating the plausibility test and the
inquiry into a pleading’s convincingness, 176 notice pleading still is a low standard since the
parties are not demanded to plead specific facts, “but only enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” 177 In this context, discovery plays a fundamental role by revealing
the facts that are necessary to the resolution of the dispute, since this function is no longer
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performed by the pleadings. According to Thomas Willging et al., in a national survey “85% of
the attorneys said some discovery had occurred in their case.” 178
To understand the cost of discovery is to understand the role and the cost of each
of its devices. The Federal Rules provide for six discovery devices: oral depositions, written
depositions, interrogatories, production of documents and tangible things, physical and mental
examination, and requests for admission. 179 Usually, the cheapest ones are interrogatories and
requests for admission. On the other hand, the more expensive discovery devices are often
written deposition, oral depositions and physical and mental examinations. Finally, production of
documents might be cheap or expensive depending on the amount of documents requested and
their availability. Recently, attention has been drawn to the high costs related to the production
of documents in digital format. In light of so many devices, a recent Federal Judicial Center
study found that the median time imposed for completion of discovery was six months. 180
Interrogatories are provided by Federal Rule 33, 181 which allows each party to
serve on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts,
without leave of court. 182 Since answering interrogatories do not require the presence of the
submitting lawyer and are made and answered in writing, with no officer participation, they are
the least expensive discovery device offered by FRCP. 183 Not surprisingly, interrogatories have
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been frequently used. According to Thomas Willging et al., 81% of the lawyers that reported
some discovery activity said they engaged in interrogatories. 184 However, because the questioner
cannot follow up evasive answers, and because it allows the party to prepare answers to the
questions asked, its usefulness is limited to identify other evidence related to the facts rather than
to prove them. 185 Hence, although interrogatories are far from being a relevant cost regarding
discovery expenses, for most of the time they will not be enough to provide the sought after
symmetry of information.
Another inexpensive discovery device is the request for admission. Federal Rule
36 186 states that a party may serve on any other party a written request to admit, for purposes of
the pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of discovery relating to facts,
the application of law to fact, or opinions about either, and the genuineness of any described
documents. 187 The cost for a request of admission is very low for the same reasons set forth
above for interrogatories. Despite of being inexpensive, this specific device saves further
discovery expense by severing the facts that are still in controversy from the ones that are not,
saving investigation costs with the latter. In fact, “[t]he rule is intended to expedite the trial and
to relieve the parties of the cost of proving facts that will not be disputed at trial, the truth of
which is known to the parties or can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.” 188 However, in a very
controversial dispute, their utility is limited and they are not going to prevent the parties from
incurring major discovery costs.
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Among the most expensive discovery devices, the written deposition was first
conceived as an alternative to the costs of oral deposition in situations such as when a deposed
person is geographically distant from the deposing party. 189 According to Federal Rule 31, 190 a
party may depose any person by written questions, including a party, without leave of court,
except as provided in Rule 31(a)(2). 191 The deposition will be taken by an officer who, after
taking the deponent’s testimony will send it to the requesting party. The use of an officer of the
court makes it a more expensive device than interrogatories. However, since a written deposition
does not require the presence of the requesting party lawyer, it saves attorney’s fees when
compared to oral deposition. 192 Although written depositions were initially thought to be more
convenient than oral depositions, because of the lower costs, only 2% of the cases use them,
instead of a 49% use of oral deposition. 193 The rare use of written deposition might be explained
by its clear difficulties for deposing hostile or reluctant witness. 194 But more important than the
reasons for its infrequent use (compared to oral deposition) is the fact that since the cheapest
deposition form is not commonly used, the average cost of discovery should increase.
Physical and mental examinations are subject to the high costs usually involved in
any expert evaluation. As consequence, the specific costs are going to depend on the complexity
of the medical investigation allowed by the court. Rule 35 195 has been read quite broadly and
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courts have authorized examinations such as X-rays, electroencephalogram, electrocardiogram,
urinalysis, ophthalmological examinations, examinations of the hymen, removal of part of the
contents of the stomach for analysis, psychiatric and psychological examinations etc. 196
However, the Rules provide for some checks before a court issues an order for physical or
mental examination. Basically, Federal Rule 35 197 requires that the mental or physical condition
is in controversy, and a showing of good cause made by the moving party. 198 Assessing the
latter, the judge will “balance the desire to insure the safety and freedom from pain of the party
to be examined against the need for the facts in the interest of truth and justice.” 199 Although the
expense of the examination will be borne by the moving party, court scrutiny might at least save
her from unnecessary discovery costs. On the other hand, the same court scrutiny may also cause
unpredictable costs for the requesting party. In fact, Federal Rule 35 200 does not secure to the
moving party the absolute right to the choice of the physician and some courts advocate that the
decision rests within the sound discretion of the court. 201 If the court appoints a professional
other than the one sought by the requesting party, the cost of the examination might be different
from that initially expected.
Definitely, one of the most expensive discovery devices is the oral deposition.
Federal Rule 30 202 allows a party to depose any person by oral questions, including a party,
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without leave of court except as provided in Rule 30(a)(2). 203 Oral depositions are expensive
because, unless the parties stipulate otherwise, they must be conducted before an officer
appointed or designated under Rule 28. 204 According to the California Civil Practice treatise,
“[t]he largest single expense in employment litigation is typically the cost of deposition
transcripts. At costs ranging from $500 to $1,000 per day of deposition testimony, it is readily
apparent how these costs can quickly mount, particularly if there are numerous witnesses.” 205
Furthermore, both parties’ attorneys, and sometimes even the parties themselves, are going to be
present during the deposition in order to participate in the examination and cross-examination of
the deposed person. 206 It means more billable hours with legal services and, sometimes, even
costs related to attorney and party’s travels to different locations where the deposition may take
place. 207 Since Federal Rule 30 208 provides each party ten depositions without leave of the court
and each deposition may take one day of seven hours, 209 each party may be threatened to spend
70 hours of legal services with adverse party’s depositions. And the expenses still go on.
Although is not required by Federal Rules, it is wise to prepare a witness to testify at a
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deposition. 210 This increases even more the oral deposition costs with attorney’s fees and,
consequently, with discovery. Despite of the high discovery costs related to oral depositions,
Thomas Willging et al. note that it is still one of the most used devices, with 67% of the lawyers
that engaged in formal discovery using them. 211
The last discovery device is the production of documents. Federal Rule 34 212
provides that a party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b) to
produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the
appointed items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control, and to permit entry
onto designated land or other property possessed or controlled by the responding party, so that
the requesting party may inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the property or
any designated object or operation on it. 213 According to Thomas Williginig et al., it is the most
frequently discovery device used by attorneys and “the activity for which the highest percentage
of attorneys reported problems in their case.” 214 Despite of this, the anecdotal information that
production of document is one of the most costly parts of discovery is not true, since it consumes
less than one third of the attorney’s costs with depositions.215
Giving a good overview about how discovery activities relate to total litigation
costs and case duration, Thomas Willging et al. state that
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Depositions accounted for by far the greatest
amount of discovery expense that flows through the attorney
(median=$3500 in cases with depositions). The next most costly
types of discovery were expert disclosure and discovery (median=
$1375), document production (median=$1100), and interrogatories
(median=$1000). Less expense was incurred by initial disclosure
(median=$750) and meeting and conferring/discovery planning
(median=$600).
Document production, often said to be the most
burdensome and costly part of discovery, typically involved rather
modest costs, at least in regard to costs that flow through the
attorney.
We examined the relationship between the above
discovery activities and litigation cost and time, and we found that
total hours spent in depositions is strongly correlated with the total
cost of litigation. We also found that as the percentage of total
costs attributable to document production increases, total litigation
costs also increase.
Looking at the relationship between discovery
activities and the duration of the litigation, we found that as the
percentage of total costs attributable to depositions increased so
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did case duration. On the other hand, when initial disclosure was
used, case duration was shorter. 216
Because discovery has a cost, a party wanting to settle a case may face the
following dilemma: whether to settle a case when it is likely that asymmetric information exists,
but saving discovery costs, or to settle it later, after costly discovery. 217 Keeping the same
premises already established (that parties are neutral to any bargaining tactics as to any litigation
risks and have symmetrical stakes) a party will settle a case whenever her perspective of
discovery cost is bigger than her settlement cost. Therefore, discovery cost may also foster
settlements.
The price of discovery and its influence on a party’s will towards settlement
might be one of the reasons for the success of the so-called “settlement mills.” Nora Freeman
Engstrom defines settlement mills as law firms “on the far end of a continuum of contemporary
personal injury practice, [that] advertise aggressively and settle what are usually low-stakes
personal injury claims in high volumes, typically with little attorney-client interaction and
without initiating lawsuits--much less taking claims to trial.” 218 Their existence is due to its
savings in transaction costs, including discovery costs, since, as they file far less lawsuits than
other personal injury practitioners, court costs, deposition costs, expert witness fees and
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attorney’s expenses are not incurred. 219 These reduced costs added to the small claim size make
settlements relatively certain for settlement mills because it is cheaper for the insurer to pay
something instead of contesting liability. 220
However, the most recent discussions regarding the economic burdens of
discovery have been focused on the costs of producing electronically stored information (ESI).
The last Federal Judicial Center study regarding the costs of civil litigation showed that
“[r]espondents reported a request for production of ESI in 30 to 40 percent of cases with any
discovery.” 221 It also found that the median costs were higher when electronic discovery was
requested. 222 Discussing this new reality, John Beisner points out that electronic discovery has
significantly increased the cost of discovery since 99% of the world’s information is now
generated electronically with the average employee sending or receiving 135 emails each day,
and approximately 36.5 trillion emails sent worldwide every year. 223 According to him,
The harsh reality is that the costs of producing electronic
documents far exceed those of producing paper documents. Unlike
paper documents, electronic data must be processed and loaded
into a special database before they can even be reviewed for
potential relevance….
….
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… One expert estimates the cost of producing a single electronic
document to be as high as $4. Verizon, which has devoted
considerable attention to electronic discovery issues, has estimated
that producing one gigabyte of data--the equivalent of between
15,477 and 677,963 printed pages--costs between $5,000 and
$7,000. But far more than a single gigabyte of data will often be at
issue. Commentators opine that even a typical midsize case now
involves at least 500 gigabytes of data, resulting in costs of $2.5 to
$3.5 million for electronic discovery alone. Another study found
that from 2006 to 2008, the average surveyed company spent
between $621,880 and $2,993,567 per case on electronic
discovery. At the high end, companies in the study reported
average per-case discovery costs ranging from $2,354,868 to
$9,759,900. 224
In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, an employment
discrimination discharge case where the employer (UBS) was accused of spoliation of evidence,
UBS sustained that the cost of producing e-mails on backup tapes would be prohibitive to most
litigants (estimated at the time at approximately $300,000.00). 225 In a copyright infringement
lawsuit, the software company Oracle requested electronic discovery that would cost $16.5
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million to the adverse party and would take one year to be produced. 226 Those cases might
represent the far edge of the electronic discovery cost, but still they show the potential burdens of
discovery, especially on corporate defendants. 227 Those figures highlight the pressures toward
settlements not just within good-faith scenarios, where a thorough investigation may cost more to
the party than to settle a close case, but also within bad-faith situations where discovery abuses,
especially against corporate defendants, may force a party to settle unmeritorious claims. 228
Although this situation might threaten the fairness goal sought by Federal Rule
1, 229 from a pure economic standpoint, claims, whether meritorious or unmeritorious, may settle
only because discovery costs are higher than the opposing party’s offer. As explained by Edward
Cooper,
We believe, and have been given an elegant model to demonstrate,
that discovery can promote settlement. We know it can often
increase delay and expense. We cannot really know whether the
present system achieves a better blend of cost with justice by
judgment and settlement than might be achieved by a dramatically
226
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different system. A system with no discovery, more trials, and less
settlement might be better. Most reform discussion, however, is set
in the framework of more modest proposals. Proposals to shift the
costs of discovery fit into this mold.230
In fact, the party’s dilemma (whether to settle when it is likely that asymmetric
information exists, but saving discovery costs, or to settle it later, after costly discovery) would
be lesser if the system provided for cost-shifting, making the requesting party or the trial loser
bear the economic burden of the information discovered. 231 Federal Rule 26 232 seems to offer
that alternative. According to it, the court may make any order which justice requires protecting
a party from undue burden or expense that might include shifting the economic burden of
discovery. 233 In Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978), the Supreme
Court held that
[T]he presumption is that the responding party must bear the
expense of complying with discovery requests, but he may invoke
the district court's discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant orders
protecting him from “undue burden or expense” in doing so,
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including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party's
payment of the costs of discovery.
However, despite of that decision, courts are still hesitant to shift the discovery cost burden. 234 In
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) a high cost-shifting standard
for e-discovery was set and has been widely followed by the courts. 235 Accordingly, “[f]or data
that is kept in an accessible format, the usual rules of discovery apply: the responding party
should pay the costs of producing responsive data. A court should consider cost-shifting only
when electronic data is relatively inaccessible, such as in backup tapes.” 236 Another solution that
has been proposed in order to reduce the economic burdens of discovery (that was also used in
Zubulake) 237 is the “sampling practice.” 238 That practice is usually adopted to permit the
restoring of a sample of backup tapes that could show the potential for relevant material. Based
on a sample, the court would be able to better asses cost-shifting and balance the cost of
production and the relevance of the information. 239 However, because courts are still reluctant to
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apply discovery cost-shifting, 240 and since “the ways in which sampling has been implemented
have been inconsistent across courts…,” 241 discovery costs still present significant pressure on
parties towards settlement.
B) American Civil Jury System and Settlements.
B.1. The Right to a Civil Jury Trial and Its Origins.
A very unique characteristic of the American civil system is the jury trial. 242 The
jury system for civil litigation is a constitutional right of the American people in the federal
courts provided by Seventh Amendment which states that
In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law. 243
Although the Seventh Amendment has not been extended to the states, 244 the right to a jury trial
is present in almost every state constitution. 245
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As one may realize from the constitutional text, civil juries are for suits at
common law, as opposed to suits at equity which, by the time the amendment was written, were
reserved to the Courts of Chancery. 246 The dual system of courts was an English legacy for the
American colonies at the dawn of the United States. 247 Nowadays, the courts of Equity no longer
exist at the Federal judicial system as well as at most state judicial systems. However, for
purposes of whether a party has a right to jury trial the distinction between claims at law and
claims at equity still remains. 248 In fact, “the courts adopted a historical test for deciding the
right to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. Under the historical test, courts seek to give
parties the same right of jury trial as they had in 1791.” 249
Most of the claims can be easily traced to well-established historical patterns. 250
The challenge is how to classify new claims and procedures that did not exist by the time of the
Seventh Amendment. 251 In Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S.
558, the Supreme Court gave some guidance to the courts, stating that
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the first ten amendments of the Constitution.”)
245
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 507 (Thomson West, 4th ed.
2005) (“A similar guarantee can be found in nearly every state constitution”) (footnote omitted)
246
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 610 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“Presumably, the
drafters of the Seventh Amendment were thinking of a world in which there were separate courts of law and equity,
a world in which one could only ‘preserve’ a right to jury trial in suits at common law. Because there had never been
a right to jury trial in equity, there was nothing to preserve and no right to jury trial”)
247
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 609 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“The English
judicial system, whose organization was echoed by colonial courts in the period immediately before the Revolution,
was divided into several jurisdictions.”)
248
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 541 (Thomson West, 4th ed.
2005) (“Since most state constitutional provisions describe the jury-trial right in terms of the same law/equity
distinction embodied in the Seventh Amendment, many of the same problems of applying the historical test under a
merged procedural system arise in the state courts.”)
249
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 610 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012)
250
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 611 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012)
251
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 612 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 8th ed. 2012) (“Knottier
problems emerge when one considers claims that did not exist at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, often those
created by statute”)

60

To determine whether a particular action will resolve legal
rights, we examine both the nature of the issues involved and the
remedy sought. “First, we compare the statutory action to 18thcentury actions brought in the courts of England prior to the
merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the
remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in
nature.” Tull, supra, 481 U.S., at 417-418, 107 S.Ct., at 1835-1836
(citations omitted). The second inquiry is the more important in
our analysis. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42,
109 S.Ct. 2782, 2790, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989).
An action for breach of a union's duty of fair representation
was unknown in 18th-century England; in fact, collective
bargaining was unlawful. See N. Citrine, Trade Union Law 4-7 (2d
ed. 1960). We must therefore look for an analogous cause of action
that existed in the 18th century to determine whether the nature of
this duty of fair representation suit is legal or equitable. 252
Despite of this challenging constitutional test provided by the Supreme Court, it is
important to note that Congress may guarantee jury trial to claims that otherwise should not be
entitled to it. In fact, since there is no constitutional right to nonjury trial in the federal-court
system, there is no obstacle to a statute that provides for trial by jury. 253 Moreover, although a
252
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constitutional guarantee, the right to a jury trial can be waived. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
38 provides that a party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed
according to the terms of subsection (b) and (c). 254
Trials by jury in state courts are far more common than bench trials. According to
a civil justice survey of state courts, jury trials accounted for almost 70% of the general civil
trials disposed in 2005. 255 However, the same survey also showed that, as opposed to civil trials
involving tort claims, 90% of which were heard before a jury, “[j]udges decided a greater
percentage of business-related civil trials – contract (64%) and real property (74%) cases – than
juries.” 256 Moreover, “[l]itigants waived their rights to a jury trial and had their cases decided by
a judge in more than 80% of contract cases involving seller plaintiff, mortgage, foreclosure,
rental lease agreement, and subrogation issues.” 257 Thus, the party’s wish of exercising her right
to a jury trial clearly varies according to the type of case.
Although a constitutional right, jury trials have been long criticized. Usually the
critics focus on two issues: the unpredictability (and even the unfairness) of a decision given by a
group of lay people; and the costs naturally involved in a jury trial. 258 The next sections will
discuss how these jury features (unpredictability and cost) may affect settlements in the modern
American civil litigation.
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B.2. Jury Unpredictability and Settlements.
Trials are unpredictable. That seems to be the core of Samuel Gross and Kent
Syverud advice:
Anticipate problems and avoid conflicts; if conflicts arise, resolve
them privately; if at all possible, do not sue. And when lawsuits are
filed, this advice is transformed into the mantra of the judge:
Settle. Every day, in countless settlement conferences, trial judges
retail [sic] their own versions of Learned Hand’s wisdom:
“They’re offering you $70,000.00. A jury could give you
$150,000.00, but I’ve seen folks just like you come up empty, lots
of times. If it were me, I’d be scared; I’d take it.” 259
Pointing out the same unpredictability, Nora Engstrom states that “it is true that the tort system is
known to compensate claimants with similar injuries quite differently.” 260 Thus, it seems there is
no doubt that trials are unpredictable.
A traditional explanation for that unpredictability is that cases that go to trial are
the close ones. 261 In fact, if the parties are always looking for the best cost/benefit relationship,
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no defendant should try a case, adding to its costs, mostly with attorney’s fees, if she knows she
is going to lose it. On the other hand, the lack of a cost-shifting rule makes it interesting for the
plaintiff to settle a dispute whenever the difference between the defendant’s proposal and the
jury’s expected award is less than the trial costs. That is why according to Samuel Gross and
Kent Syverud, in a study performed with cases that actually went to trial in California Superior
Courts, “[t]hose law suits that are fought to the end are indeed risky, costly and unpredictable.”
The question is whether this unpredictability would be lower if the trial was held by a judge
instead of a jury.
Whatever the answer for that question might be, parties and lawyers seem to have
their own perception that juries are more unpredictable than judges. 262 Samuel Gross and Kent
Syverud’s advice rendered above seems to agree with that, since it portrays the unpredictability
of a jury’s decision. Following the same path, Charles D. Gill, Jr., Joseph A. Santos, and Curtiss
L. Isler state that among the noted advantages of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) it is the
“avoidance of volatile and unpredictable jury awards.” 263 Professor Dru Stevenson remembers
that the Founders inadvertently introduced the jury unpredictability into the legal system when
trying to dilute state power. 264 Accordingly,
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The variation among petit juries means that the
results of any given case are not guaranteed—a good result is not a
certainty, but neither will the results be consistently bad—and the
Framers understood tyranny, it seems, in terms of consistently
oppressive results. They also understood that government could
naturally become tyrannical without safeguards, so it seems
reasonable to presume that they designed their jury system to
include such mechanisms. 265
The reasons for the public perception that juries are the “least predictable of the
decision makers in the legal system” 266 are quite known. First, judges are easier to be identified
than jurors whose identities are unknown until the jury-selection process. 267 As consequence, it
is easier to assess a judge’s history, her rulings, prior relationships and experiences. 268 Second,
judges are experienced practitioners, whose decisions are deemed to be very rational, as opposed
to jurors that are presumed to decide based on intuitions, personal biases, and values. 269
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Studies, however, have demonstrated that “[j]udges and juries are in fact not so
different.” 270 According to Kevin Clermont, the classic work of Professors Harry Kaven and
Hans Ziesel during the 1950s found a 78% agreement between judge and jury on liability
issues. 271 That finding is remarkable because:
When compared to other human decisionmakers,
this 78% agreement rate proves better than the rate of agreement
on dichotomous decisions between scientists doing peer review,
employment interviewers ranking applicants, and physicians
diagnosing patients, and almost as good as the 79% or 80% rate of
agreement

between

judges

themselves

making

sentencing

decisions on custody or no custody in an experimental setting. 272
Professors Valerie Hans and Theodore Eisenberg also state that “when scholars have compared
the decision making of juries and judges, and other decision makers, the overall patterns appear
more similar than different.” 273 These findings show that, since discovery has already uncovered
those cases with clear outcomes, allowing for them to settle earlier on (for the economic reasons
set forth above) the cases that go to trial are the ones which outcome is difficult to predict, no
matter who decides them. 274
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Nevertheless, for purpose of settlements, more important than the truth about the
jury’s unpredictability is the perception parties have about it. Parties make their decisions to
settle or not a case based on their expectations about the trial outcome. Even if parties
misperceive jury’s unpredictability, their perception directly impacts their trial expectations and,
as consequence, their will to settle or not a case. 275 In this context, for purposes of settlements,
what really matters is how parties perceive jury’s unpredictability. Dru Stevenson holds that
“[j]ury predictability is directly proportional to the likelihood of settlement; when the parties are
uncertain about what the jury might decide, they are less likely to agree to a settlement,
preferring to take their chances.” 276 This conclusion seems to be in harmony with the economic
model of civil litigation. In fact, parties settle based on their trial expectations, so they can save
trial costs. 277 If the decision is unpredictable, parties are less prone to converge about the likely
outcome of the case. 278 Therefore, uncertainty about trial outcome prejudices the parties’
economic incentives to settle the dispute, decreasing the settlement rates. 279
On the other hand, it must be noted that many parties and lawyers refer to jury
unpredictability meaning, actually, that juries are biased towards one of the parties, what makes
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them more predictable than unpredictable. 280 In fact, according to Kevin Clermont, “Tort
reformers and others portray juries as having a pro-plaintiff bias. Juries are believed to find
liability when judges would not, to grant higher awards than judges, and to grant inappropriate
punitive damages awards.” 281 Since this perception also changes the parties’ predictions about
potential trial outcomes, it also affects settlements. However, different from what happens when
the parties perceive juries as real unpredictable decisionmakers, the perception of juries as biased
factfinders tends to elevate the settlement rates. 282 In fact, since parties realize that the jury is
more prone to a party than to another, they should “adjust their settlement behavior to account
for the increased value of the plaintiff’s claim.” 283 That seems to be the case with punitive
damages. Especially regarding tort cases, where the punitive damage shadow is always present,
the “unpredictability” (understood as a pro-plaintiff bias) of a jury punitive damage award has a
decisive role in the defendant’s wish for settling the dispute. 284
Here, again, the parties’ perception might be disconnected from the reality. 285 In
fact, according to a civil justice survey of state courts, the percentage of litigants awarded

280

Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 378-79 (2011)
(“Finally, we also have to acknowledge that when a lawyer complains about the unpredictability of juries, he or she
might not be talking about predictability at all. Instead, the lawyer might be saying that juries are unfair and reach
decisions against them all too often--in fact, all too predictably.”)
281
Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1127 (1992)
(footnotes omitted)
282
Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1129 (1992)
(“If both parties perceive that one party has a highly favorable adjudicator, the case is unlikely to be tried.”)
283
Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1129 (1992)
284
Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 169, 172 (1998)
(“My thesis is that even though the empirical research consistently shows that punitive damages are rare and wellcontrolled by the judiciary, this remedy plays a significant role in driving settlements. The empirical evidence
suggests that the business community's fear of runaway punitive damages is exaggerated. However, what litigators
‘define as real, becomes real in their consequences.’ A belief that punitive damages are ‘out of control’ and
randomly assessed may create a self-fulfilling prophesy as parties negotiate claims according to their perceptions of
the populist behavior of juries. Anecdote, hyperbole and simple confusion may shape settlements in a more powerful
way than empirical truths.”) (footnotes omitted)
285
Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1109 (1996) (“While critics
claim that jury verdicts are irresponsible and capricious, serious students of the jury are virtually unanimous in their
high regard for the jury as a decision-maker. Undoubtedly courts could improve juror performance in many ways,

68

punitive damages in tort jury and bench trial did not present a detectable difference. 286
Nevertheless, parties’ perception, or misperception, about juries is still relevant to settlements, 287
because parties do take in consideration who is the decisionmaker before deciding whether or not
to settle a dispute, and in which basis to do so. 288 Therefore, settlement rates are directly affected
by the jury system. Whether juries increase or not these rates depends on how parties conceive
their unpredictability. If they perceive juries as really unpredictable decisionmakers, juries
should foster trials instead of settlements since parties are less prone to converge about the likely
outcome of the case. However, if parties perceive juries as pro-plaintiff biased factfinders, parties
should adjust their settlement behavior in order to take this jury feature in consideration. Since
that bias makes juries more predictable than unpredictable, even if this predictability is just a
misrepresentation of a jury’s impartiality, both parties should be more prone to converge about
the probable trial outcome, increasing their chances of settling their case. Finally, it seems well
accepted that, at least in tort litigation, a defendant’s perception of juries as pro-plaintiff
decisionmakers makes her more willing to settle than to try her case, especially in light of the
threat of a punitive damage award.
B.3. The Costs of Jury Trials and Settlements.
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The trial stage of the civil litigation accounts for a great part of the transaction
cost of a legal dispute, especially because of attorneys and expert witnesses’ fees. In order to
measure the costs of each stage of the civil procedure, the National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) has developed a method for cost estimation – the Civil Litigation Cost Model (CLCM) –
relying on the amount of time expended by attorneys in various litigation tasks. 289 Accordingly,
cases were divided in 6 types: automobile tort, premises liability, real property dispute, breach of
contract, employment dispute, and professional malpractice. Applying that model, Paula
Hannaford-Argor and Nicole Waters found that “[f]or all case types, a trial is the single most
time-intensive stage of litigation, encompassing between one-third and one-half of total litigation
time in cases that progress all the way through trial.” 290 Specifically regarding automobile tort
cases, the trial stage accounted for 46% of the total median hours spent by attorneys during
litigation. 291 They also pointed out that approximately 80% of the expert witness expenses are
allocated to the trial stage for expert testimony. 292 A study commissioned by the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules also found that cases terminated by trial had higher costs,
approximately 53% higher for plaintiffs, and 24% higher for defendants, than cases that did not
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terminated by trial, all else equal. 293 The question, thus, is whether jury trials are more expensive
than bench trials.
Since the transaction costs of legal disputes are proportional to the time spent by
parties during the litigation, 294 the answer for which type of trial costs the most (whether trial by
jury or judge) depends on their length. Two measures of time might be used here. One related to
how long litigants have to wait before and after trial until the final disposition of the case, and
the other related to how long the actual in-court trial lasts. 295 Regarding the first measure, a civil
justice survey of state courts found that the mean case processing time from filing to disposition
was 26.6 months for jury trials, as opposed to 20.8 months for bench trials. 296 However, in the
federal judicial system the reality seems to be the opposite. Theodore Eisenberg and Kevin
Clermont explain that in federal courts “the mean judge-tried case spends 755 days on the
docket, while the mean jury-tried case terminates in 678 days. Medians tell the same story: the
median judge case took 619 days and the median jury case took 566 days.” 297 One reason for that
difference might be that “the state courts, unlike the federal courts, are imposing waiting costs
upon those who wish a jury trial and not on those who agree to a bench trial, with the effect of
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discouraging jury trials.” 298 Nevertheless, since the longer it takes to a case reach termination,
the higher the litigation costs, 299 the answer for whether or not jury trials are more expensive
than bench trials might depend on whether the case is tried in a state or federal court.
On the other hand, according to the other measure, the in-court trial length
measure, jury trials seem to consume much more time from parties, lawyers, witnesses and
experts than bench trials. 300 In fact, according to Theodore Eisenberg and Kevin Clermont:
The available data generally agree that jury trials take about twice
as long as judge trials, although admittedly trials on average are
rather short so that the absolute difference is not great. Most of
these studies do not control for the type of case but, instead, simply
compare lengths of all jury trials and all judge trials. Nevertheless,
rough attempts to control for the type of case confirm that jury
trials take about twice as long. Certainly, most opinions agree that
jury trials last longer. The theory is that the extra steps of jury trial,
such as jury selection and instructions, more than consume such
savings as the possible streamlining of evidence for presentation to
the jury. 301
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In fact, according to a civil justice survey of state court, “jury trials lasted two days longer on
average than bench trials.” 302 The same survey also pointed out that 70% of bench trials were
completed within one day, while only 13% of jury trials lasted that short. 303
Since longer trials consume more attorney and expert witness billable hours, 304
cases tried by juries are expected to be more expensive than cases tried by judges, all else equal.
Providing some jury figures, a study performed by Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud, involving
cases tried in California Superior Courts, showed that the average jury trial length is nine days
and the average deliberation length is nine hours. 305 In the same study, the authors deemed fair to
assume an average spent of approximately $5,000 per day for each side of the dispute, for cases
tried in 1990-91. 306 Accordingly, the average jury trial used to cost roughly $45,000 for each
party in the beginning of the 90’s.
From an economic standpoint, considering the average length of a jury trial, the
prospect of a jury trial should foster more settlements than the prospect of a bench trial.
According to the economic model of civil litigation, whenever parties have the same
expectations about the trial outcome, they should settle the dispute in order to save the trial

302

Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 8 (Oct., 2008), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf
303
Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 8 (Oct., 2008), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf
304
Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, Caseload Highlights, COURT
STATISTICS PROJECT, 1-2 (Jan., 2013) http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx (acknowledging the
attorney’s preponderance to the total cost of the legal disputes, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) has
developed a method for cost estimation: the Civil Litigation Cost Model (CLCM), relying on the amount of time
expended by attorneys in various litigation tasks.)
305
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 31-33 (1996)
306
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 44 (1996)

73

costs. 307 In fact, because of the American rule, which provides that each party should bear his/her
own litigation costs, making even the winner fall short of full compensation, 308 both parties are
economically incentivized to settle the dispute as soon as possible. Since litigants are always
looking for the most efficient way to resolve their disputes, minimizing costs and maximizing
gains, the higher the trial costs the more they should be prone to settle the case. 309 Because jury
trials usually present higher costs than bench trials, all else equal, the threat of a jury’s
adjudication cost should make the parties more willing to settle their dispute.
IV – Conclusion.
All man-made systems are concerned with efficiency, including the civil justice
system. This premise was adopted by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when
they aimed equally justice, speed and cost as goals for the interpretation and administration of
the rules. An economic model for determining system efficiency is easily accepted in civil
litigation of purely economic and private matters. This acceptance is due to the public perception
of justice as a private peace between litigants instead of a search for truth or an opportunity for
advancing public policies. Since settlements prevent public and private expenditures with trials,
appeals, and judicial enforcement, they provide a faster and cheaper resolution for conflicts than
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a judge or jury adjudication. In this context, whether from a pre-trial or post-trial standpoint,
settlements accomplish economic efficiency for both state and parties.
In light of the private and public advantages of a settlement, it is important to
understand what fosters the consensual resolution of civil disputes in the United States so it may
be promoted. Since economic efficiency is the most accepted model, settlements should occur
when they express the best cost/benefit relationship to the parties. Therefore, in order to
understand the reasons for settlements in civil litigation it is necessary to understand the costs of
resolving legal disputes and the way these costs are allocated in the American civil justice
system. The American attorney’s fee arrangements, the lack of public finance for litigation, and
the restrictions on cost-shifting altogether contribute to the American high settlement rate.
Moreover, legal institutes such as discovery and civil jury trials play a decisive role in the
amount of cases that settle before trial. In fact, the information symmetry caused by discovery as
well as its costs drive parties towards a consensual resolution of their disputes. In the same way
the threat of an unpredictable, long and expensive civil jury trial makes both parties more willing
to settle than to try their case. As a result, most cases settle. Therefore, the vanishing U.S. trial is
not an accident but a consequence of procedural tools and public policies that externalize an
American predilection for settlements instead of trials.

